United States District Court, D. Delaware
Dale Kevin McNeill ("Plaintiff"), an inmate at the
Howard R. Young Correctional Institution in Wilmington,
Delaware, commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on August 29, 2016.
September 9, 2019, Plaintiff filed his fourth (renewed)
motion for injunctive relief seeking medical care, unhappy
that the Court had denied his third motion for injunctive
relief on August 5, 2019. (See D.I. 64, 65, 66) In
the motion, Plaintiff also references the Court's July
22, 2019 Order that granted a motion to strike Plaintiffs
response to Defendant's answer. (See D.I. 61,
66) It seems, but is not clear, that Plaintiff moves for
reconsideration of the July 22, 2019 Order.
once against refers to his medical conditions and contends
that he is refused medical treatment. Plaintiff states that
he was taken to the hospital on August 29, 2019, seen by a
neurologist on August 31, 2019, and seen in the prison
infirmary on September 2, 2019. (D.I. 66 at 2-4)
MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELEIF
seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to
the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors
such relief. Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx
Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted). "Preliminary injunctive relief is 'an
extraordinary remedy' and 'should be granted only in
limited circumstances.'" Id. (citations
omitted). Because of the intractable problems of prison
administration, a request for injunctive relief in the prison
context must be viewed with considerable caution. Abraham
v. Danberg, 322 Fed.Appx. 169, 170 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir.
motion will be denied for the same reasons as his second and
third motions for injunctive relief. (See D.I. 39,
40, 64, 65) As previously discussed by the Court,
Plaintiff's medical conditions are monitored, and he
receives medical care. Notably, in his most recent motion,
Plaintiff refers to medical care and treatment he recently
received in August and September 2019.
prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical
treatment," so long as the treatment provided is
reasonable. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132,
138-140 (2d Cir. 2000). An inmate's claims against
members of a prison medical department are not viable under
§ 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but
believes that more should be done by way of diagnosis and
treatment and maintains that options available to medical
personnel were not pursued on the inmate's behalf.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Finally,
"mere disagreement as to the proper medical
treatment" is insufficient to state a constitutional
violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235
(3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
the record before the Court, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
the likelihood of success on the merits or that he will
suffer irreparable harm if the motion is denied. His own
statement indicates that he receives medical care, albeit not
to his liking. Therefore, injunctive relief is not
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Court turns next to reconsideration of the July 22, 2019
order to the extent that is what Plaintiff seeks. The
standard for obtaining relief under Rule 59(e) is difficult
for Plaintiff to meet. The purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to "correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence."
Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). "A
proper Rule 59(e) motion ... must rely on one of three
grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct
a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice." Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666,
669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A
motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded on a
request that a court rethink a decision already made. See
Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F.Supp.
1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 22, 2019
Order will be denied. Plaintiff provides no reasons for
reconsideration, and he has failed to demonstrate any of the
necessary grounds to warrant a reconsideration of the July
22, 2019 Order.