Submitted: September 30, 2019
Defendant, Kadeem Rose's, Motion for Postconviction
R. Wallace, Judge.
18th day of October, 2019, upon consideration of the
Defendant Kadeem Rose's Pro Se Motion for
Postconviction Relief (D.I. 15), the Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation that Mr. Rose's Pro Se
Motion for Postconviction Relief should be
DENIED, and the record in this case, it
appears to the Court that:
April 17, 2017, a grand jury indicted Kadeem Rose for two
counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited
("PFBPP"), Possession of Ammunition by a Person
Prohibited ("PABPP"), Carrying a Concealed Deadly
Weapon, Receiving a Stolen Firearm, two counts of Illegal
Possession of a Controlled Substance (or Counterfeit
Controlled Substance), and Failure to Use a Turn
July 31, 2017, Mr. Rose pleaded guilty to one count of
PFBPP. He was sentenced immediately to 15 years
at Level V, suspended after five years for two years at Level
Mr. Rose did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
June 2018, Mr. Rose filed a timely pro se Motion for
Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal
After expansion of the record and the State's response,
that motion was referred to Superior Court Commissioner
Janine M. Salomone in accordance with 10 Del. C.
§ 512(b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 62 for
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations for its disposition.
Commissioner docketed her Report and Recommendation on
September 30, 2019. The Commissioner recommended that Mr.
Rose's Motion for Postconviction Relief be
"Within ten days after filing of a Commissioner's
proposed findings of fact and recommendations . . . any party
may serve and file written objections."Neither Mr. Rose
nor the State filed an "objection" to the
Commissioner's Report under Criminal Rule 62(a)(5)(ii).
Court accepts, in whole, the findings of fact and
recommendations made by the Commissioner. After a thorough
review of the record in this case, the Court finds there is
no constitutional or legal basis to doubt the validity of Mr.
Rose's conviction-his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. Nor is there a doubt that Mr. Rose's
counsel was wholly effective when evaluating his case for
potential suppression issues, when litigating the issues that
counsel had a good faith basis to believe had merit, when
negotiating a plea resolution, and when assisting Mr. Rose
while entering his guilty plea. In short, it plainly appears
from the motion and the record of prior proceedings that Mr.
Rose is not entitled to postconviction relief.
THEREFORE, after careful and de novo review of the
record in this case, and for the reasons stated in the
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation of September 30,
2019, Mr. Rose's Motion for Postconviction Relief is