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Cole v. Metzger

United States District Court, D. Delaware

October 17, 2019

DONALD COLE, Petitioner,
v.
DANA METZGER, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.

          Donald Cole. Pro se Petitioner.

          Maria T. Knoll, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION [1]

          CONNOLLYT UNITED STASIS DISTRICT JUDGE

         Pending before the Court is Petitioner Donald Cole's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and his Amended Petition ("Petition"). (D.I. 2; D.I. 41) The State filed an Answer and an Amended Answer. (D.I. 13; D.I. 44) For the reasons discussed, the Court will deny the Petition.

         I. BACKGROUND

         A. Factual Background For Lancaster Avenue and East 23rd Street Convictions

         As set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Petitioner's second post-conviction appeal, the facts leading to Petitioner's arrests and convictions are as follows:

[Petitioner] and Larry Johnson were charged with shooting and injuring two residents while burglarizing a home on Lancaster Avenue in Wilmington [on August 22, 2001]. [...] [Petitioner], Johnson, and Travanian Norton were [also] accused of shooting and killing two residents while burglarizing a home on 23rd Street in Wilmington [on August 31, 2001]. The same guns were used in both burglaries.
The State charged [Petitioner] for the Lancaster Avenue burglary along with Elwood Hunter. [Petitioner] knew Hunter was not involved in the burglary and wanted to give a statement to exonerate him. [Petitioner's] counsel advised him not to and warned that if he did so, the State would likely charge him for the 23rd Street murders and seek the death penalty. [Petitioner] nonetheless insisted on giving the statement, and the parties negotiated a plea agreement. The parties disagree, however, on exactly what the State promised [Petitioner] in exchange for the statement.
According to the State, they agreed that if [Petitioner] pleaded guilty and gave a statement providing information about both the Lancaster Avenue and 23rd Street burglaries, they would "consider" waiving the death penalty for the 23rdStreet charges. They would not waive the death penalty, however, "until they knew the content and substance of [Petitioner's] statement." According to [Petitioner], he "believed that, in exchange for [his] truthful statement, the State would not seek the death penalty." In addition, [Petitioner] believed the statement would be used only for "review and consideration of the death penalty," and not "for any other purpose." The agreement was not reduced to writing.
On January 14, 2003, [Petitioner] gave the statement. At the beginning of the recording, the attorney for the State specified, "we are going to take [a] proper statement of what you have to say about anything we ask you about and I'm going to take that statement back to my superiors and discuss with them whether to make you an offer where you would be spared capital punishment." The State said nothing about using the statement for any other purpose. In his statement, [Petitioner] exonerated Hunter and admitted his involvement in both the Lancaster Avenue and the 23rdStreet burglaries. He stated that Norton was an accomplice in the 23rd Street burglary and that Johnson was an accomplice in both. [Petitioner] then pleaded guilty to the charges of attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited for the Lancaster Avenue burglary and shooting. [The Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to 18 years at Level 5 suspended after 15 years for probation for the attempted first degree murder conviction, to a total of 3 years at Level 5 for the 3 PFDCF convictions, and to 1 year at Level 5 for the first degree assault conviction. Petitioner did not appeal.]
Following the Lancaster Avenue plea, the State charged [Petitioner] with the 23rd Street murders and sought the death penalty. [Petitioner] filed a motion to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty, arguing it had agreed to waive it in exchange for his statement. The court denied [Petitioner's motion, finding "[t]he transcript contain[ed] no promises about benefit to [Petitioner] as a result of the proffer, other than [the State's] willingness to consider the information and review [Petitioner's] request again with the senior staff." The State also questioned Norton about his involvement in the 23rd Street burglary and played him a part of [Petitioner's] recorded statement. After hearing that [Petitioner] implicated him, Norton agreed to give a statement and testify against [Petitioner] in exchange for a favorable plea deal. [Petitioner] filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from his statement, including Norton's statement and testimony, arguing that the State did not reveal it was going to use the statement for any purpose other than possible waiver of the death penalty. The court denied that motion as well, finding the State had only agreed not to use the audiotape at trial. The court allowed Norton to testify.
Also prior to trial, an inmate, Gary Lloyd, came forward and said his cellmate confessed to committing the burglary. [Petitioner's] counsel did not investigate Lloyd or his cellmate. According to [Petitioner], his counsel only communicated with him five times outside of court proceedings. At trial, Norton was the only witness to implicate [Petitioner]. In his statement, Norton said that he saw [Petitioner] climb into a window from the roof, but was not sure how [Petitioner] got onto the roof. At trial, however, Norton testified that he saw [Petitioner] climb onto an open trash can and saw Johnson push [Petitioner] up onto the roof. Norton also testified that once inside, he saw [Petitioner] shoot one victim, and saw [Petitioner] and Johnson both shoot the other. The defense attorney never visited the crime scene, but did cross-examine a state witness about the area, including the lighting and the characteristics of the roof. On July 31, 2004, the jury convicted [Petitioner] of four counts of first degree murder, first degree burglary, second degree conspiracy, and five counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The jury did not impose the death penalty, and the court sentenced [Petitioner] to life in prison.
[Petitioner] appealed the 23rd Street conviction, arguing the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statement and evidence derived from it. On October 20, 2005, [the Delaware Supreme Court] remanded the case but retained jurisdiction, requiring the Superior Court to make explicit factual findings regarding the proffer. The [Superior Court] made the factual findings on March 14, 2006, and [the Delaware Supreme Court] affirmed [Petitioner's] convictions on March 12, 2007. On July 17, 2007, [Petitioner] filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective counsel and insufficient evidence, which the Superior Court denied on December 7, 2007. [The Delaware Supreme Court] affirmed on April 30, 2008. Next, [Petitioner] filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was stayed at [Petitioner's request so he could file an amended motion for postconviction relief in the Delaware Superior Court. He filed the motion on October 22, 2010, alleging sixteen counts of ineffective counsel. On September 21, 2012, the Superior Court Commissioner denied [Petitioner's amended motion, which [Petitioner] appealed. On August 1, 2017, the Superior Court affirmed the Commissioner's denial after holding three days of evidentiary hearings and allowing [Petitioner] to appoint an investigator and ballistics expert.

Cole v. State, 181 A.3d 614 (Table), 2018 WL 1129109, at*1-*2 (Del. Feb. 28, 2018). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision on February 28, 2018. Id. at*6.

         B. Procedural Background in § 2254 Proceeding

         On May 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. (D.I. 2) After the State filed its Answer on October 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay the proceeding. (D.I. 13; D.I. 16; D.I. 19) On April 7, 2009, the Honorable Gregory M. Sleet granted Petitioner's unopposed Motion to Stay the proceedings to allow Petitioner to exhaust state remedies. (D.I. 24) On August 1, 2018, the State informed the Court that Petitioner's Rule 61 proceedings were completed. The Court lifted the stay on September 25, 2018. (D.I. 35) Petitioner filed an amended Petition on February 19, 2019, and the State filed its amended Answer on April 4, 2019. (D.I. 41; D.I. 44) Petitioner filed a Reply to the Answer on May 29, 2019. (D.I. 50) The Petition is ready for review.

         II. GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

         A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

         Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences .. . and to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism." Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Claims based on errors of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review, and federal courts cannot re-examine state court determinations of state law issues. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ("[s]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law"); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that claims based on errors of state law are not cognizable on habeas review). Additionally, AEDPA imposes procedural requirements and standards for analyzing the merits of a habeas petition in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).

         B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

         Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). AEDPA states, in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(1).

         The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to give "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45; see Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A [Petitioner] satisfies the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that the habeas claims were "fairly presented" to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, in a procedural manner permitting the court to consider the claims on their merits. See Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 451 n.3 (2005); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). A federal legal claim is "fairly presented" to state courts when there is: (1) reliance in the state courts on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) reliance on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact situations; (3) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution; and (4) allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation. See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999). If the petitioner raised the issue on direct appeal in the correct procedural manner, the claim is exhausted and the petitioner does not need to raise the same issue again in a state post-conviction proceeding. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1996).

         If a petitioner presents unexhausted habeas claims to a federal court, and further state court review of those claims is barred due to state procedural rules, the federal court will excuse the failure to exhaust and treat the claims as exhausted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 750-51 (1991) (such claims "meet[] the technical requirements for exhaustion" because state remedies are no longer available); see also Woodford v. A/go, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006). Such claims, however, are procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749; Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000). Similarly, if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court "clearly and expressly" refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim is exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64(1989).

         Federal courts may not consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the court does not review the claims. See McCandless, 172 F.3d at 260; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a [Petitioner] must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors during his trial created more than a possibility of prejudice; he must show that the errors worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Id. at 494.

         Alternatively, if a petitioner demonstrates that a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, "[2] then a federal court can excuse the procedural default and review the claim in order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2001). The miscarriage of justice exception applies only in extraordinary cases, and actual innocence means factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. A petitioner establishes actual innocence by asserting "new reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial," showing that no reasonable juror would have voted to find the [Petitioner] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2004).

         C. Standard of Review

         If a state's highest court adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the federal court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may only be granted if the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the state court's decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). A claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if the state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a procedural or some other ground. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). The deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies even "when a state court's order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). As explained by the Supreme Court, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 99.

         Finally, when reviewing a habeas claim, a federal court must presume that the state court's determinations of factual issues are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is only rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (stating that the clear and convincing standard in § 2254(e)(1) applies to factual issues, whereas the unreasonable application standard of § 2254(d)(2) applies to factual decisions).

         III. DISCUSSION

         The instant Petition asserts the following seven grounds for relief related to Petitioner's convictions for the 23rd Street murders: (1) the Delaware Superior Court erred by not suppressing all evidence obtained through the use of the pre-trial proffer Petitioner gave to prosecutors before he entered a guilty plea in his Lancaster Avenue trial; (2) Petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the State presented the prior out-of-court statement of a witness (Bessie Warner) who was unable to recall her statement given to police; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a window screen that had not been properly authenticated into evidence; (4) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the murders were not in furtherance of a burglary; (5) the trial court provided erroneous felony murder jury instructions in the 23rd Street trial; (6) the trial judge was biased because the one of the prosecutors had been the judge's law clerk many years prior to the trial; (7) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate with Petitioner, failing to interview other suspects, and failing to visit the crime scene; and (8) cumulative error.

         A. Claim One: Denial of Suppression Motion

         In Claim One, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress all evidence "gained through the use of the audiotaped statement he gave to the State prior to his trial in the Lancaster Avenue attempted murder case which exonerated wrongfully accused Hunter but implicated Norton in the 23rd Street murders. According to Petitioner, prior to making a full statement regarding both the Lancaster Ave and 23rd Street incidents, he and the State entered into an oral agreement whereby Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to the Lancaster Avenue attempted murder charges in exchange for the State not seeking the death penalty for Petitioner in the 23rd Street murder trial. Petitioner contends that the State breached the agreement by confronting Norton with Petitioner's statement, which resulted in Norton making a deal with the State and giving a statement that implicated Petitioner in the 23rd Street murders. Prior to his trial on the 23rd Street murders, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from his statement, including Norton's statement and testimony, arguing that the State did not reveal it was going to use Petitioner's statement for any purpose other than considering whether to waive the death penalty. (D.I. 45-14 at 39-43) After conducting an office conference (D.I. 45-14 at 43-50), the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that State had only agreed not to use the audiotape at trial (which was already prohibited by Delaware Rule of Evidence 410). (D.I. 45-14 at 38, 49) Norton testified for the State during the 23rd Street murder trial in return for leniency. "The police possessed no other evidence linking Norton to the crime ... [and] Norton was the only witness who unequivocally identified Petitioner as the perpetrator in the 23rd Street murders at trial." Cole v. State, 922 A.2d 354, 379 (Del. 2005). Petitioner presented the argument concerning the Superior Court's allegedly erroneous denial of the suppression motion to the Delaware Supreme Court on direct appeal of his convictions in the 23rd Street murders, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed Norton's testimony and all other evidence derived from the use of Petitioner's audiotaped statement. The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case to the Superior Court to address questions related to the admissibility of the evidence derived from the State's use of Petitioner's proffer. After the Superior Court answered the remand questions, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did not err In denying the suppression motion and admitting the evidence derived from Petitioner's audiotaped statement.

         The State contends that Claim One fails to assert an issue cognizable on federal habeas review, because the Delaware state courts analyzed the parameters of the oral agreement/proffer under "the auspices of state contract law, rather than federal constitutional law." (D.I. 44 at 17) What the State ignores, however, is that Petitioner challenges the Delaware state courts' factual determination regarding the parameters of the oral agreement/proffer, which is an issue properly analyzed under § 2254(d)(2). In other words, since Petitioner challenges the factual basis for the Delaware Supreme Court's affirmance of the Superior Court's denial of his suppression motion, Claim One will warrant relief if the Delaware Supreme Court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

         The fundamental question the Court must answer in determining if Claim One warrants relief is whether the record supports Petitioner's version of the agreement or the Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion about the terms the agreement. The Court starts with the Delaware Supreme Court's extensive and thorough factual summary as set forth below:

Before the trial for the conduct that occurred at 1348 Lancaster Avenue, the Deputy Attorney General assigned to prosecute the case filed a motion in limine, seeking to admit evidence about a double homicide that had occurred on August 31, 2001, at 105 East 23rd Street in Wilmington. No. one had been charged with the murders at that time, but the motion proffered that ballistics evidence would show that the firearms used in the attempted murder at 1348 Lancaster Avenue were the same as those used In the murders at 105 East 23rd Street. The motion in limine also proffered that the State would produce a witness who would testify to having seen both [Petitioner] and Hunter near the alley behind 105 East 23rd Street, armed with handguns on the night of August 31, 2001. The trial judge denied the State's motion.
During the "1348 Lancaster Avenue" trial, the State did not produce any witness who identified [Petitioner]. The State, however, did produce an eyewitness who identified Hunter as one of the assailants in the attempted murder. That witness testified that she was so sure of her identification, that her level of certainty was an eleven on a zero to ten scale.
[Petitioner] however, knew that the witness had mistakenly identified Hunter. In an effort to exonerate Hunter, [Petitioner] informed his trial attorney, Brian Bartley, that he would plead guilty to the charges in the 1348 Lancaster Avenue case if the State would drop its prosecution of Hunter. Bartley advised [Petitioner] not to plead guilty and told him that the State's case against him was weak. Bartley also advised [Petitioner] that, if he pled guilty to the charges in the 1348 Lancaster Avenue case, the State, based on the ballistics evidence proffered in the motion in limine, likely would charge [Petitioner] with the 105 East 23rd Street murders and seek the death penalty.
Despite Bartley's advice, [Petitioner] was determined to exonerate Hunter. On January 13, 2003, during a break in the trial, Bartley told the DAG that [Petitioner] wanted to give a statement exonerating Hunter. Bartley sought to strike a deal with the DAG in which the State would not seek the death penalty in the 105 East 23rd Street murders. In exchange for not seeking the death penalty, [Petitioner] would plead guilty to the 1348 Lancaster Avenue charges, and would give a full statement regarding both the 1348 Lancaster Avenue and the 105 East 23rd Street incidents. The DAG told Bartley that he was interested in this deal, but he would have to take [Petitioner's] offer to "the senior staff" in the Attorney General's office before he could confirm the deal.
The senior staff met on the morning of January 14, 2003, to discuss [Petitioner's] offer. The trial judge, however, refused to delay the ongoing trial, so the trial continued with the State and the defense resting by midday on January 14. After a lunch break, the DAG and Bartley resumed their negotiations. They decided that [Petitioner] would confess to the attempted murder at 1348 Lancaster Avenue, and provide a statement regarding the 1348 Lancaster Avenue and 105 East 23rd Street crimes. Also, the DAG informed Bartley that the senior staff would not consider waiving the death penalty for [Petitioner] with regard to the 105 East 23rd Street murders until they knew the content and substance of [Petitioner's] statement. The DAG and Bartley, however, did not put any agreement in writing and have since disagreed about the terms of any such agreement.
Both Bartley and [Petitioner] believed that, in exchange for Petitioner's truthful statement, the State would not seek the death penalty for the 105 East 23rd Street murders. Bartley also believed that the DAG's comments before and after [Petitioner's] statement confirmed that the State would limit the use of [Petitioner's] statement to the senior staffs review and consideration of the death penalty. In other words, Bartley believed that the trial DAG had represented that he would present [Petitioner's] statement to the senior staff so they could assess its truthfulness and that the State would not use [Petitioner's] statement for any other purpose.

         On the afternoon of January 14, 2003, [Petitioner], pursuant to what he now asserts was his understanding of the agreement, gave an audiotaped statement regarding the two cases. At the beginning of [Petitioner's] statement, the DAG told [Petitioner] that:

the deal right now is that we are going to take uh a [proffer] statement of what you have to say about anything we ask you about and I'm going to take that statement back to my superiors and discuss with them whether to make you an offer where you would be spared capital punishment. Do you understand that?

         The DAG proffered no other use of the statement before [Petitioner] began to speak.

[Petitioner] responded that he understood. [Petitioner] then admitted his involvement in the 1348 Lancaster Avenue attempted murder, provided a detailed statement of the incident, including how he gained entry into the residence, and identified his accomplice. [Petitioner] also gave a detailed statement concerning the 105 East 23rd Street murders and implicated Travanian Norton and Larry Johnson as his accomplices. At that time, the State had no evidence linking Norton to the 105 East 23rd Street murders. At the end of the interrogation, the following exchange occurred between the DAG and Petitioner.
[DAG]: We'll we'll [sic] terminate this and uh I'm gonna go back to my office and do what I told you I was gonna do [at] the beginning of this interview. Okay and uh obviously this conversation is not over we'll pick it up. Plus you don't want us to discuss the substance of this outside this room. Yeah we're not gonna talk about this with Sticky or Larry Johnson or anybody else. I I [sic] understand what you're saying, but listen why this is still ongoing there's a reason why we we [sic] want that. We know what you're saying to us and we we're [sic] gonna hold up our end. But listen we can't have anybody [know] it the less people know the less it's gonna leak out there, (emphasis supplied)
[Petitioner]: I think Sticky already ...

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