United States District Court, D. Delaware
JAMES COPPEDGE and KRISHA M. COPPEDGE, Movants,
JANET Z. CHARLTON, Respondent.
Honorable Maryellen Noreika United States District Judge
before the Court are various motions for seeking a
preliminary injunction against a foreclosure sale (D.I. 1, 5,
6) (together, “Emergency Motions”) filed by
pro se movants James Coppedge and Krisha Coppedge
(together, “Movants”). The Emergency Motions are
filed in the above-captioned action, which, although styled
as an appeal, appears to have been initiated solely to
prevent a foreclosure sale scheduled for October 3, 2019, and
not to review any decision of the Bankruptcy Court below.
(See D.I. 1).
above-captioned proceeding is the fourth matter filed by one
or more of the Movants and currently pending before this
Court. See Coppedge v. Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC, No. 19-12-MN; Coppedge v. Specialized Loan
Servicing LLC, No. 19-13-MN; and Coppedge v. Michael
B. Joseph, Chapter 13 Trustee, No. 19-713-MN. Those
appeals concern various orders entered by the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
(“Delaware Bankruptcy Court”) in Mr.
Coppedge's Chapter 13 case, captioned In re James
Coppedge, Case No. 17-12341 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del.).
See No. 19-12-MN, D.I. 1 (appeal of the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court's December 20, 2018 Order denying
Coppedge's motion for reconsideration of a prior
“Order Granting Motion to Strike Debtor's Motion
for Default Judgment With Counterclaim and Awarding
Fees”); No. 19-13-MN, D.I. 1 (appeal of the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court's December 20, 2018 “Order
Striking Notice of Default and Dishonor of SLS, LLC”);
No. 19-713-MN, D.I. 1 (appeal of the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court's April 4, 2019 Order denying Coppedge's Motion
for Reconsideration of a prior “Order Striking Notice
of Discharge”). Because Movants proceed pro
se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally, and it
will treat the Emergency Motions as motions for stay of the
foreclosure sale pending Movants' appeals of the various
orders entered by the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 13 case
in connection with the property and foreclosure.
have named Janet Z. Charlton as respondent to the Emergency
Motions (“Respondent”). Importantly, Ms. Charlton
was not a party to any of these proceedings. The Court has
considered the answering brief filed by Ms. Charlton (D.I.
17), along with Movants' replies in further support of
the Emergency Motion (D.I. 19, 20, 21). The Court has also
considered Movants' Motion for Extraordinary Emergency
Relief (D.I. 22) and Motion for Extraordinary Stay (D.I. 23),
which appear to seek substantially the same relief sought in
the Emergency Motions.
2011, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Banc of
America Funding Corporation (BAFC) 2007-3 (“U.S.
Bank”) filed a foreclosure action against Movants in
the Superior Court of the State of Delaware (“Superior
Court”) with respect to the premises known as 52
Barkley Court, Dover, Delaware. At the time the complaint was
filed, the mortgage had been in default since September 2008.
(See D.I. 17-2 at Exh. 1 (“Complaint”)).
Movants filed an Answer and Counterclaims, which did not deny
that the mortgage was in default but rather asserted various
incomprehensible arguments. Given that the defenses to
mortgage foreclosure are limited, JPMorgan Chase Bank v.
Hopkins, 2013 WL 5200250 at *2 (Del. Super. Sept. 12,
2013), U.S. Bank filed a Motion to Strike Answer and Dismiss
Permissive Counterclaims and Grant Summary Judgment, which
was granted. Movants were “barred from filing
additional frivolous pleadings.” (D.I. 17-2 at Exh. 2).
appealed this ruling to the Delaware Supreme Court which
affirmed the finding of the Superior Court that the
Movants' “disjointed” and
“unintelligible” pleadings were without merit.
Coppedge v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 525, 2011 at 3, 4
(Del. 2011) (D.I. 17-2 at Exh. 3).
these final decrees, the Superior Court has had to deny the
same types of pleadings filed by Movants, including motions
to set aside the judgment (id. at Exh. 4) and stay
the sale (id. at Exh. 5), motion to seal
(id. at Exh. 6), motion to void judgment
(id. at Exh. 7), and motion to reconsider
(id. at Exh. 8). The Superior Court docket lists the
numerous unmeritorious pleadings Movants have filed.
(Id. at Exh. 9).
also filed bankruptcy petitions in United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(“Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court”), Case No.
16-15806 (see D.I. 17-2 at Exh. 10 (bankruptcy court
docket) and two cases in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, Case
Nos. 13-11098 and 17-12341 (see Id. at Exh. 12),
which were temporarily successful in staying the scheduling
of a foreclosure sale but could not permanently stay
enforcement actions. Motions for Relief from the Automatic
Stay were granted in the Pennsylvania bankruptcy case
(id. at Exh. 13) and in one of the Delaware
bankruptcy cases (id. at Exh. 14). The other
Delaware bankruptcy petition was dismissed. (See Id.
at Exh. 15). Thereafter, Movants have filed five appeals to
the District Court of the District of Delaware. (See
id. at Exhs. 16-20 (dockets of the appeals)). Three of
the most recent of these appeals have been briefed by the
Appellee and are currently pending. The foreclosure sale is
scheduled for October 3, 2019. Most recently, Movants have
filed a Motion to Void Judgment and Fifth Pluries Lev Fae to
stop the upcoming foreclosure sale in the Superior Court
(see id. at Exh. 9, D.I. 123-128). Briefing on that
matter is complete.
parties completed briefing on Movant's Emergency Motions
on September 26, 2019. (See D.I. 5, 6, 17, 21).
Movants have made numerous additional filings which are not
in compliance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
or Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or the briefing
schedule in this case. (See D.I. 9, 12, 14, 18, 19,
Because Movants proceed pro se, the Court construes
these pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro
se is to be liberally construed.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court has therefore considered
all of the papers filed by the parties in this appeal. The
Court did not hear oral argument because the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record,
and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
by oral argument.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765
F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008)). Preliminary injunctive relief is an
extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited
circumstances. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578,
586 (3d Cir. 2002). “The relevant inquiry is whether
the movant is in danger of suffering irreparable harm at the
time the preliminary injunction is to be issued.”
SJ Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244,
1264 (3d Cir. 1985). “[F]ailure to establish any
element in [a plaintiffs] favor renders a preliminary
injunction inappropriate.” The Nutrasweet Co. v.
Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir.