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Ratledge v. Dematteis

United States District Court, D. Delaware

September 24, 2019

MICHAEL RATLEDGE, Petitioner,
v.
CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner, Delaware Department of Corrections, ALAN GRINSTEAD, Bureau Chief, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.[1]

          J. Brendan O’Neill, Office of Defense Services for the State of Delaware, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Petitioner.

          Brian L. Arban, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION [2]

          NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Pending before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) filed by Petitioner Michael Ratledge (“Petitioner”). (D.I. 2). The State filed an Answer in opposition, to which Petitioner filed a reply. (D.I. 9; D.I. 13). For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition.

         I. BACKGROUND

         On June 6, 2013, Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of drug dealing. (D.I. 9 at 1). On July 23, 2013, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner as follows: (1) on one drug dealing charge, to eight years at Level V incarceration, suspended after three years for one year at Level IV supervision, followed by one year at Level III supervision; and (2) on the other drug dealing charge, to eight years at Level V incarceration suspended after two years, followed by one year at Level III supervision. (D.I. 9 at 2). Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

         On May 7, 2014, Delaware’s Office of Defense Services (“OPD”) filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61 motion”) on Petitioner’s behalf. (D.I. 15 at 1). The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion on April 20, 2015, and denied his motion for reargument on June 17, 2015. (D.I. 9 at 2). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s Rule 61 motion on December 9, 2015. (D.I. 9 at 2).

         On September 21, 2016, the OPD filed a § 2254 Petition on Petitioner’s behalf, asserting that Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of an evidence scandal at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) was material to his decision to plead guilty and, therefore, his guilty plea was involuntary pursuant to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). (D.I. 2). Petitioner also argues that the Delaware Supreme Court made unreasonable findings of fact during his postconviction appeal regarding OCME misconduct. The State filed an Answer asserting that the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred or, alternatively, because the claims are meritless. (D.I. 9). Petitioner filed a Reply, asserting that the Petition should be deemed timely filed after applying § 2244(d)(1)(D) and the doctrine of equitable tolling. (D.I. 13 at 3).

         A. OCME Criminal Investigation

         The relevant information regarding the OCME evidence mishandling is set forth below:

In February 2014, the Delaware State Police (“DSP”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began an investigation into criminal misconduct occurring in the Controlled Substances Unit of the OCME.
The investigation revealed that some drug evidence sent to the OCME for testing had been stolen by OCME employees in some cases and was unaccounted for in other cases. Oversight of the lab had been lacking, and security procedures had not been followed. One employee was accused of “dry labbing” (or declaring a test result without actually conducting a test of the evidence) in several cases. Although the investigation remains ongoing, to date, three OCME employees have been suspended (two of those employees have been criminally indicted), and the Chief Medical Examiner has been fired.
There is no evidence to suggest that OCME employees tampered with drug evidence by adding known controlled substances to the evidence they received for testing in order to achieve positive results and secure convictions. That is, there is no evidence that the OCME staff “planted” evidence to wrongly obtain convictions. Rather, the employees who stole the evidence did so because it in fact consisted of illegal narcotics that they could resell or take for personal use.

Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1204-05 (Del. 2015).

         II. PETITION IS NOT TIME-BARRED

         The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) prescribes a one-year period of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners, which begins to run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to statutory and equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (statutory tolling).

         Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition, filed in 2016, is subject to the one-year limitations period contained in § 2244(d)(1). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The State contends that the starting date for the limitations period is August 22, 2010, the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final. (D.I. 9 at 7). Petitioner, however, appears to assert that he is entitled to a later starting date for AEDPA’s limitations period – April 15, 2014 – under § 2244(d)(1)(D), because that is the date on which the State began to notify defendants in certain active cases about the OCME evidence misconduct. (D.I. 13 at 2).

         In order to determine if the April 15, 2014 revelation of the OCME misconduct constitutes a newly discovered factual predicate warranting a later starting date for the limitations period under §2244(d)(1)(D), the Court must first distill Petitioner’s OCME misconduct argument to its core. The argument appears to be two-fold. First, Petitioner asserts a twist on the typical Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) claim by alleging that the State’s affirmative representation that it had fulfilled its Brady v. Maryland obligation when, in fact, it did not disclose the at-that-time undiscovered OCME misconduct, violated his constitutional rights and affected his ability to voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Second, he contends that the Delaware state courts should have deemed his guilty plea involuntary under Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) due to the State’s failure to disclose the Brady v. Maryland evidence, i.e., the OCME misconduct. In short, Petitioner asserts that his lack of knowledge about the OCME misconduct is vital to his habeas Claim because that lack of knowledge rendered his guilty plea involuntary and unknowing under Brady v. United States.

         Pursuant to Brady v. United States, a guilty plea is considered involuntary if it is “induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. A violation of Brady v. Maryland occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially favorable to the accused, including both impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.[3] See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). For purposes of the inquiry under § 2244(d)(1)(D), whether or not the OCME misconduct affected, or could have affected, Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty depends on whether the drugs in his case were tested by the OCME and the results were provided to him prior to entering a plea. Therefore, in order to trigger a later starting date under § 2244(d)(1)(D) for this involuntary plea/Brady v. Maryland claim, Petitioner must show that (1) the drug evidence in his case was tested by the OCME and he received the results of the test before entering a plea; and (2) exercising due diligence, he could not have learned that the evidence in his case may have been part of the compromised drug evidence involved in the OCME scandal until April 15, 2014. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner has met this burden.

         First, the State provided a copy of the OCME report to Petitioner on May 13, 2013, and he pleaded guilty on June 6, 2013. Second, facts sufficient to provide a basis for a good faith claim that state employees engaged in impermissible conduct were not available to defense counsel until April 15, 2014 when, as part of its Brady v. Maryland obligation, the State informed Petitioner and other defendants that all drug evidence housed at the lab was susceptible to compromise.[4] (D.I. 13 at 2).

         Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that AEDPA’s limitations period in this case began to run on April 15, 2014.[5] Accordingly, to comply with the one-year limitations period, Petitioner had to file his § 2254 petition by April 15, 2015. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) and (e) applies to federal habeas petitions); Phlipot v. Johnson, 2015 WL 1906127, at *3 n.3 (D. Del. Apr. 27, 2015) (AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is calculated according to the anniversary method, i.e., the limitations period expires on the anniversary of the triggering event).

         Petitioner did not file the instant § 2254 Petition until September 21, 2016, approximately one year and four months after the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Therefore, the Petition is time-barred, unless the limitations period can be statutorily or equitably tolled. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010)(equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (statutory tolling).

         A. Statutory Tolling

         Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed application for state collateral review tolls AEDPA’s limitations period during the time the application is pending in the state courts, including any post-conviction appeals, provided that the application is filed during AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations period, however, is not tolled during the ninety days a petitioner has to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court regarding a judgment denying a state post-conviction motion. See Stokes v. Dist. Attorney of Philadelphia, 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 2001).

         Here, when Petitioner filed his Rule 61 motion on May 5, 2014, twenty days of the limitations period had already expired. The Rule 61 motion tolled the limitations period from June 20, 2014 December 9, 2015, the date on which the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the motion. The limitations clock started to run again on December 10, 2015, and ran another 286 days until Petitioner filed the instant on September 21, 2016. At that point in time, there were fifty-nine days remaining in AEDPA’s limitations period. Thus, the Petition is timely filed. The Court will proceed to review the Claims in the Petition.

         III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         When a state’s highest court has adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the federal court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if the state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a procedural or some other ground. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may only be granted if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, ” or the state court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). This deferential standard of § 2254(d) applies even “when a state court’s order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied”; as recently explained by the Supreme Court, “it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-100 (2011).

         Finally, a federal court must presume that the state court’s determinations of factual issues are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is only rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (stating that the clear and convincing standard in ...


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