United States District Court, D. Delaware
Georkeshia Denise Campbell, Lancaster, California; Pro Se
Eileen Polesky, Esquire, Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young,
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Defendant Navient
C. Weiss, United States Attorney, and Jesse S. Wenger,
Assistant United States Attorney, Wilmington, Delaware.
Counsel for Defendant United States Department of Education.
ANDREWS, U.S. JUDGE.
Georkeshia Denise Campbell, who appears pro se,
filed this action on July 16, 2018, in the Justice of the
Peace Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle
County. Defendant United States Department of Education
removed the matter to this Court on October 19, 2018. (D.I.
1). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 17,
2018. (D.I. 11). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Pending are Defendants' motions to
dismiss the Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs oppositions.
(D.I. 17, 20). The matters have been fully briefed. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendants'
accept what the amended complaint states as true for the
purposes of Defendants' motions. Plaintiff obtained
student loans when she attended the University of Phoenix and
Antelope Valley College. (D.I. 11 at 3
("Introduction" at ¶ 2)). Between May and June
2009, the loans were paid in full by her former spouse, who
made the payment at the Department of Education in
Washington, D.C. (Id. at ¶ 3). Shortly
thereafter, Joseph Campbell, a relative and FBI employee,
visited the Department of Education and requested a refund of
the payment. (Id.).
student loan servicer sent an e-mail confirming that the loan
had been paid in full, but, in January 2010, the University
of Phoenix advised Plaintiff there was a $586.87 balance on
her account. (Id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff paid the
amount by check via express mail to the Department of
Education. (Id.). Student loan servicer Sallie Mae
provided another email confirmation that the student loan had
been paid in full and that a refund was due because excessive
interest was charged to the account. (Id. at ¶
5). "Next, the student loan servicers sent an invoice
stating that the account was under paid and was due a payment
of $586.57, to be paid in full." (Id. at ¶
years went by. In 2018, Plaintiff was notified the federal
government had "confiscated [her] tax refund to pay
of[f] an outstanding student loan debt due, the phone survey
stat[ing] the amount owed was in the amount of $103,
115.86." (Id.). Plaintiff "requested an
explanation of the amount as stated to be owed," but
"no response was given by the servicer Navient or the
United States Department of Education." (Id.).
legal theories are not entirely clear. One page (which I will
call "Count One") refers to "civil
rights," Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(3)(b),
1982, 1983, and 1985. (Id. at 5 "Causes of
Actions"). The next page (which I will call "Count
Two"} refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and (b), 42
U.S.C. § 1997 and 18 U.S.C. § 1332 as well as the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Both Counts allege that: (1) Plaintiff has been
denied equal protection and "accesses to rights as
promised within the contractual agreement," (2)
Plaintiff was "denied rights to receive statements of
the paid account;" and (3) Defendants "knew [that]
the failure to supervise employees would result in fraudulent
transactions." (Id. at pp.4-5). Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages and injunctive relief.
Department of Education moves for dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. (D.I. 17). Navient
Corporation moves to dismiss for failure to state any claim
upon which relief may be granted. (D.I. 20).
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the
dismissal of an action for "lack of subject matter
jurisdiction." A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as
either a facial or factual challenge to the court's
subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v. Wells
Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack
contests the sufficiency of the pleadings, whereas a factual
attack contests the sufficiency of jurisdictional facts.
See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d
99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015). When considering a facial attack, the
court accepts the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations
as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those
allegations in the plaintiffs favor. See In re Horizon
Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 846
F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017). When reviewing a factual
attack, the court may weigh and consider evidence outside the
pleadings. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States,
220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).