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Campbell v. Navient Corp.

United States District Court, D. Delaware

August 13, 2019

NAVIENT CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

          Georkeshia Denise Campbell, Lancaster, California; Pro Se Plaintiff.

          Joelle Eileen Polesky, Esquire, Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Defendant Navient Corporation.

          David C. Weiss, United States Attorney, and Jesse S. Wenger, Assistant United States Attorney, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant United States Department of Education.


          ANDREWS, U.S. JUDGE.

         Plaintiff Georkeshia Denise Campbell, who appears pro se, filed this action on July 16, 2018, in the Justice of the Peace Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County. Defendant United States Department of Education removed the matter to this Court on October 19, 2018. (D.I. 1). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 17, 2018. (D.I. 11). The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pending are Defendants' motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs oppositions. (D.I. 17, 20). The matters have been fully briefed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendants' motions.


         I accept what the amended complaint states as true for the purposes of Defendants' motions. Plaintiff obtained student loans when she attended the University of Phoenix and Antelope Valley College. (D.I. 11 at 3 ("Introduction" at ¶ 2)). Between May and June 2009, the loans were paid in full by her former spouse, who made the payment at the Department of Education in Washington, D.C. (Id. at ¶ 3). Shortly thereafter, Joseph Campbell, a relative and FBI employee, visited the Department of Education and requested a refund of the payment. (Id.).

         The student loan servicer sent an e-mail confirming that the loan had been paid in full, but, in January 2010, the University of Phoenix advised Plaintiff there was a $586.87 balance on her account. (Id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff paid the amount by check via express mail to the Department of Education. (Id.). Student loan servicer Sallie Mae provided another email confirmation that the student loan had been paid in full and that a refund was due because excessive interest was charged to the account. (Id. at ¶ 5). "Next, the student loan servicers sent an invoice stating that the account was under paid and was due a payment of $586.57, to be paid in full." (Id. at ¶ 6).

         Eight years went by. In 2018, Plaintiff was notified the federal government had "confiscated [her] tax refund to pay of[f] an outstanding student loan debt due, the phone survey stat[ing] the amount owed was in the amount of $103, 115.86." (Id.). Plaintiff "requested an explanation of the amount as stated to be owed," but "no response was given by the servicer Navient or the United States Department of Education." (Id.).

         Plaintiffs legal theories are not entirely clear. One page (which I will call "Count One") refers to "civil rights," Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(3)(b), 1982, 1983, and 1985. (Id. at 5 "Causes of Actions"). The next page (which I will call "Count Two"} refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and (b), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 and 18 U.S.C. § 1332 as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Both Counts allege that: (1) Plaintiff has been denied equal protection and "accesses to rights as promised within the contractual agreement," (2) Plaintiff was "denied rights to receive statements of the paid account;" and (3) Defendants "knew [that] the failure to supervise employees would result in fraudulent transactions." (Id. at pp.4-5). Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief.

         The Department of Education moves for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (D.I. 17). Navient Corporation moves to dismiss for failure to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. (D.I. 20).


         Rule 12(b)(1).

         Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal of an action for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction." A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack contests the sufficiency of the pleadings, whereas a factual attack contests the sufficiency of jurisdictional facts. See Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015). When considering a facial attack, the court accepts the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiffs favor. See In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017). When reviewing a factual attack, the court may weigh and consider evidence outside the pleadings. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).

         Rule ...

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