Submitted: May 8, 2019
appeal from the Family Court Court Below: Family Court of the
State of Delaware ID. No. 1711009911 (N)
P. Tray, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware for Appellant, Arthur
P. Lugg, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington,
Delaware for Appellee, State of Delaware.
STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices.
appellant, Arthur Stoner,  appeals from a Family Court order
finding him delinquent of Robbery in the Second Degree and
Conspiracy in the Second Degree. He makes three claims on
appeal. First, he contends that the finding that he committed
Conspiracy in the Second Degree violated his right to due
process because it was based on a finding that he violated an
uncharged subsection of the conspiracy statute. Second, he
contends that there was insufficient evidence to find him
delinquent of Robbery in the Second Degree. In particular, he
contends that the Family Court misconstrued a part of the
robbery statute, 11 Del. C. § 831(b), which
provides that "the phrase 'in the course of
committing theft' includes any act which occurs . . . in
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the
theft." Third, he contends that 11 Del. C.
§ 512(1), the subsection of the conspiracy statute under
which he was found delinquent, is unconstitutionally vague
because it does not expressly include the requirement of an
State agrees that the Family Court erred when it found Stoner
delinquent for violating an uncharged subsection of the
conspiracy statute. According to the State, "The trial
court effectively convicted Stoner of an offense for which
the State had not charged him. His adjudication of second
degree conspiracy should be vacated." Because the State
concedes error and agrees that Stoner's adjudication of
delinquency as to Conspiracy in the Second Degree should be
vacated, we accept its concession and have no further need to
discuss Stoner's first contention. For this same reason,
Stoner's third contention, that 11 Del. C.
§ 512(1) is unconstitutionally vague, need not be
addressed. We need address only Stoner's contentions
relating to the Family Court's finding of delinquency for
Robbery in the Second Degree.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
November 16, 2017, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Jessica
Halloran exited a restaurant in Trolley Square in Wilmington.
She saw "two guys" across the street "hanging
by the Fed Ex box." Although one of the them, later
identified as Tayshaun Gibbs, was facing her, the other,
later identified as Arthur Stoner, was facing away from her.
As she crossed the street toward them, Gibbs kept looking up
and down from his phone, which illuminated his face
"pretty clearly." Thinking this was odd, Halloran
intentionally made direct eye contact with him. As soon as
she did that, he looked down again. Gibbs was wearing a black
hooded sweatshirt and blue jeans. Although Halloran never saw
Stoner's face, she saw that he was wearing a black hooded
sweatshirt and khaki pants.
a few seconds of Halloran walking past them, Gibbs grabbed a
wristlet bag Halloran was carrying, ripping it off the hook
strap. Both Gibbs and Stoner immediately ran off, with Stoner
slightly ahead, in the direction from which Halloran had
come, eventually leaving her sight. Although there was never
any communication from either Gibbs or Stoner to Halloran or
between Gibbs and Stoner themselves before or during the
robbery, Halloran later testified that they appeared to be
police were notified, and shortly thereafter, Gibbs and
Stoner were stopped approximately ten blocks away by Corporal
David Simmons of the Wilmington Police Department.
Approximately twenty minutes after the robbery, Halloran was
transported to the area, and she identified Gibbs and Stoner
as the two individuals who had robbed her. Recognizing his
face, she specifically identified Gibbs as the one who took
her wristlet. She identified Stoner based on his clothing.
She also identified her wristlet, which had been found near
where Gibbs and Stoner were stopped.
trial, following the conclusion of the State's case,
Stoner moved for judgment of acquittal on the robbery charge.
Citing the lack of any communications between the two accused
and the only evidence pertaining to Stoner being his
"mere presence at the scene" and his flight, Stoner
argued that there was "simply no evidence that the
presence or the actions of [Stoner] indicate[d] that he was
aiding, soliciting, requesting, [or] facilitating the crime
of robbery." The court denied the motion, explaining
that there was "sufficient evidence to substantiate the
closing arguments, the court rendered its verdict. After
noting the requirements for Robbery in ...