United States District Court, D. Delaware
Quadrey Salaam-Roane, Howard R. Young Correctional
Institution, Wilmington, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Spring Monzo, Esquire, and Karine Sarkisian, Esquire, White
& Williams, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Defendants.
ANDREWS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Quadrey Salaam-Roane, Jr., an inmate at the Howard R. Young
Correctional Institution in Wilmington, Delaware, filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 1).
Plaintiff appears pro se and has been granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 6). Before the
Court is Defendant Mitchell A. White's motion to dismiss.
(D.I. 36). Briefing is complete.
Court screened the Complaint on December 28, 2017, and
identified cognizable and non-frivolous claims. (See D.I. 9).
White moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on two
grounds: (1) that the Complaint fails to state a claim for
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment; and (2)
Plaintiff did not comply with the requisites of
Delaware's Health Care Negligence Insurance and
Litigation Act, 8 Del. C. §§ 6801-6865. Plaintiff
opposes the motion and notes that the Complaint survived the
Court's initial screening.
reviewing a motion filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Because Plaintiff proceeds ; pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. A Rule
12(b)(6) motion maybe granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the complainant, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a
complaint must do more than simply provide 'labels and
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.'" Davis v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). I am
"not required to credit bald assertions or legal
conclusions improperly alleged in the complaint." In
re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d
198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002). A complaint may not be dismissed,
however, "for imperfect statement of the legal theory
supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of
Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
complainant must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim
has "substantive plausibility." Id. at
347. That plausibility must be found on the face of the
complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
[complainant] pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the [accused] is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. Deciding
whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense." Id. at
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials
provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976). In order to set
forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (i) a serious
medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials
that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v.
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison
official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a
prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails
to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may
manifest deliberate indifference by "intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S.; at 104-05.
prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical
treatment," so long as the treatment provided is
reasonable. Lasko v. Watts, 373 Fed.Appx. 196, 203
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219
F.3d 132, 138-140 (2d Cir. 2000)). An inmate's claims
against members of a prison medical department are not viable
under § 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care,
but believes that more should be done by way of diagnosis and
treatment and maintains that options available to medical
personnel were not pursued on the inmate's behalf.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
Moreover, allegations of medical malpractice are not
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. White
v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990);
see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
332-34 (1986) (negligence is not compensable as a
constitutional deprivation). Finally, "mere disagreement
as to the proper medical treatment" is insufficient to
state a constitutional violation. See Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
noted above, White argues that dismissal is appropriate for
failure to state a claim for deliberate indifference under
the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, White relies upon a recent
Third Circuit case that upheld dismissal of a prisoner civil
rights medical needs case, Anderson v. Bickell, 754
Fed.Appx 113 (3d Cir. 2018), to argue that challenges
questioning medical judgment do not plausibly state a
constitutional claim of deliberate indifference.
Anderson, however, is distinguishable from the
instant case. In Anderson, the ...