United States District Court, D. Delaware
Liles, FMC Rochester, Rochester, Minnesota, Pro Se Plaintiff.
NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Danny Liles (“Plaintiff), an inmate at FMC Rochester in
Rochester, Minnesota, filed this action pursuant to the
Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2051 to § 2083. (D.I. 3). He appears pro
se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (D.I. 5). The Court proceeds to review and
screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
alleges that he was injured by the “direct use of
dangerous and harmful pharmaceutical products”
manufactured by Defendants Proctor and Gamble Company
(“Proctor & Gamble”) and Astra Zeneca
Manufacturing Co. (“Astra Zeneca”). (D.I. 3 at 1).
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a comatose condition,
partial blindness, irreversible damage to his esophagus, and
he has a titanium plate lodged in his brain from the use the
medication. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff raises his claims
under the CPSA. (Id. at 1, 3). He also alleges
violations of his right to due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(Id. at 3).
seeks ten million dollars in compensatory damages as well as
punitive damages. (Id.)
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if “the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Ball v. Famiglio,
726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro
se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because
Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally
construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or
“fantastic or delusional” factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; see also Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch
v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took
an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint
or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, the Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations “could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though
“detailed factual allegations” are not required,
a complaint must do more than simply provide “labels
and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.” Davis v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d
306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to
show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014). A
complaint may not be dismissed for imperfect statements of
the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See
id. at 10.
the pleading regime established by Twombly and
Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2)
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and
(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts
in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is
plausible will be a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.