United States District Court, D. Delaware
Usef Wiggins, Sr., Sussex Correctional Institution,
Georgetown, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Nakia Usef Wiggins, Sr. (“Plaintiff), a pretrial
detainee at the Sussex Correctional Institution in
Georgetown, Delaware, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (D.I. 1). He appears pro se and has
been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(D.I. 6). The Court proceeds to review and screen the matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and §
was arrested on November 29, 2018, for possession of cocaine.
At his arraignment Defendant Delaware JP Court Magistrate
Judge R. Hudson (“Judge Hudson”) stated that
Plaintiff was currently on bail from a June 30, 2016 charge.
(D.I. 1 at 5). Plaintiff alleges that he was not indicted on
that charge until January 7, 2019. (Id.). Judge
Hudson revoked Plaintiff s bond. (Id. at 6).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Delaware Deputy Attorney
General Lindsey M. Taylor (“Taylor”) refused to
set a bail bond after numerous letters, motions, and
conference calls. (Id.).
alleges that Delaware Attorney General Kathleen Jennings
(“Jennings”) signed the three-year-old
indictment. (Id.). Plaintiff believes the time limit
for filing the indictment lapsed. (Id.). He
complains that he has been held without bail since November
29, 2018 on a three- year-old drug charge. (Id. at
5). Plaintiff seeks punitive damages and release from prison.
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if “the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma
pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in
which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant).
The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint
as true and take them in the light most favorable to a
pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because
Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally
construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may
dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory” or a
“clearly baseless” or “fantastic or
delusional” factual scenario. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327-28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878
F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding
frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §
1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when
deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the
Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint
unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations “could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though
“detailed factual allegations” are not required,
a complaint must do more than simply provide “labels
and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.” Davis v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d
306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to
show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014). A
complaint may not be dismissed for imperfect statements of
the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See
id. at 10.
the pleading regime established by Twombly and
Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2)
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and
(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts
in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is
plausible will be a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id.