United States District Court, D. Delaware
William Lee Grant, II, Springfield, Illinois. Pro Se
ANDREWS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
William Lee Grant, II proceeds pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This
action was commenced on April 26, 2019. (D.I. 2). The Court
proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
alleges that Defendant Joint Chiefs of Staff created him
(i.e., Plaintiff) in the basement of the Pentagon in
1990 to be "The Judge" as to whether the Vietnam
War constituted war crimes. He alleges that Defendant Gregory
K. Harris left the Pentagon in the early 1990's to
surveil him by bribing Plaintiffs family, and his peers,
teachers, co-workers, and supervisors to report his words and
actions to Harris. Plaintiff also complains that he was
retaliated against for filing a civil rights action in 2012,
and he was forced to spend seven years as a homosexual. These
are just a few, of the over eighty, disjointed and
fantastical allegations raised in the Complaint. Plaintiff
seeks $99 trillion in compensatory damages.
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro
se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscherv. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint
or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
proceeds pro se and, therefore, his pleading is
liberally construed and his complaint, "however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6),
a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Ml. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). "Though
'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a
complaint must do more than simply provide 'labels and
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.'" Daw's v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In
addition, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show
that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v.
City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014). A complaint may not
be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal
theory supporting the claim asserted. See Id. at 10.
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court should
follow a three-step process: (1) consider the elements
necessary to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that are
merely conclusions and therefore are not well-pleaded factual
allegations; and (3) accept any well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and determine whether they plausibly
state a claim. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp.,
809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); Williams v. BASF
Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).
Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a
"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
the Court construes pro se filings liberally,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble.429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)),
Plaintiffs Complaint states no recognizable causes of action.
The Court finds the Complaint contains fantastical and/or
delusional claims that are insufficient to withstand the
Court's evaluation for frivolity dismissal under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 32-33 (1992) (complaint may be dismissed as lacking a
basis in fact if premised upon allegations that are fanciful,
fantastic, and delusional); Golden v. Coleman, 429
Fed.Appx. 73 (3d Cir. 2011). In addition, the Court notes
that Plaintiff has been recognized as a frequent filer of
frivolous litigation in federal courts throughout the country
and he has made the same claims in many of his filings.
See Grant v. United States Department of the
Treasury, 2018 WL 3748415 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (dismissing
complaint as barred by res judicata and as frivolous, and
noting that Plaintiff had filed at least seventeen complaints
in various ...