United States District Court, D. Delaware
Matthew Jones, Greenwood, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
ANDREWS, U.S District Judge
Matthew Jones, who appears pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed
this action on August 8, 2018. (D.I. 2). He asserts
jurisdiction by reason of a federal question. The Court
dismissed the original Complaint following screening pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff was given leave
to amend only as to claims raised under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (D.I. 8 at 6; D.I. 9). Plaintiff timely filed an
Amended Complaint. (D.I. 10). The Court proceeds to review
and screen the Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
discussed in the Court's November 19, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion, Plaintiff raises claims similar to those in other
cases he filed in this Court against different defendants.
Plaintiff complains of actions between 2015 through 2017.
(D.I. 10 at 3). The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff
has been: (1) held against his will and confined in violation
of the Eighth Amendment; (2) erroneously injected with
"life-threatening medications" in
"life-threatening doses" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; (3) forced to swallow anti-psychotic medications
when he does not suffer from a psychotic disease; (4)
diagnosed with a "stigmatized mental disease that
involves eating waste, delusions, hallucinations, and
illiteracy" in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment;
and (5) defrauded by the medical profession and legal system
who work "in stolen, forged, and shared
identities." (D.I. 10 at 4-10).
did in the original Complaint, Plaintiff raises claims under
federal criminal statutes, refers to the Mental Health Bill
of Rights, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 3, 6-
12). The Amended Complaint also mentions 42 U.S.C. §
1985 and refers to Delaware law. (Id. at 3, 5).
Plaintiff seeks two billion dollars in damages. (Id.
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and
take them in the light most favorable to a pro se
plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscherv. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a
complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave
to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable
or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
proceeds pro se and, therefore, his pleading is
liberally construed and his amended complaint, "however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6),
a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). "Though
'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a
complaint must do more than simply provide 'labels and
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.'" Daw's v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In
addition, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show
that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v.
City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint
may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of
the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See
Id. at 346.
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court should
follow a three-step process: (1) consider the elements
necessary to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that are
merely conclusions and therefore are not well-pleaded factual
allegations; and (3) accept any well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and determine whether they plausibly
state a claim. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,
809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); Williams v. BASF
Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).
Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a
"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
was given leave to amend only as to claims raised under
§ 1983. (D.I. 8 at 6). He realleges and attempts to
reinstate other dismissed claims. Plaintiff was not given