my decision on your tenth motion for postconviction relief.
Your motion contains two arguments. First, you assert that
the failure by your attorney to suppress a statement at trial
that was allegedly elicited in an illegal manner constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, you argue that,
under Martinez v. Ryan,  I should allow you to
reargue claims contained in your initial postconviction
motion with the assistance of appointed counsel.
faced with a claim for postconviction relief I must first
determine whether any procedural bars prevent a consideration
on the merits of any underlying arguments. Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61, governing postconviction relief, states
that all such motions beyond the first must be summarily
dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial and
either (1) pleads that new evidence exists showing that the
movant is actually innocent in fact, or (2) pleads that a
new, retroactive constitutional rule applies to the
movant's case thereby rendering the conviction invalid. I
find that neither of your arguments satisfy the conditions
necessary to survive summary dismissal.
first argument is a barely perceptible deviation from the
numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in
your previous motions for postconviction relief. This
argument neither includes a claim that you are actually
innocent of the crimes for which you were convicted nor
implicates a new constitutional rule. Further, I have already
extensively addressed the issues raised in this argument in
my decisions on your previous motions.
second argument misconstrues Martinez v.
Ryan. Martinez permits a federal
court to review a "substantial" ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on federal habeas review. The United
States Supreme Court made clear that its decision did not
establish a constitutional right to counsel in state
postconviction proceedings. When this Court amended Rule 61 to
provide an indigent defendant the right to counsel in his or
her first postconviction motion, it clarified that this right
was not retroactive. This Court was explicit in that the
amendment only applied to initial postconviction
motions pending as of May 6, 2013, or such motions filed
after May 6, 2013. You filed your first motion for
postconviction relief on March 5, 2003.After a careful review
and consideration of your claims therein I denied that motion
by order dated August 6, 2003. Thus, the Rule 61 amendment at
issue here is not relevant to your case as your first
postconviction motion had long since been decided by May 6,
2013. Accordingly, I find that your second argument also
fails to satisfy the Rule 61 conditions necessary to survive
your tenth motion for postconviction relief. Rule 61
explicitly states that all subsequent postconviction relief
motions beyond the first are procedurally barred and must be
summarily dismissed unless they fall under certain exceptions
discussed above. I do not find that you have plead facts
sufficient to qualify for any of these exceptions.
tenth motion for postconviction relief is
Scott Bradley, Judge.
 566 U.S. 1(2012).
Younger v. State, 580
A.2d 552, 554 (Del. ...