Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Floyd v. United States

United States District Court, D. Delaware

April 23, 2019

ANTHONY JAMES FLOYD, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, and ROBERT DE LOS SANTOS, Special Agent, Respondents.

          MEMORANDUM

         At Wilmington, this 18 day of April, 2019, having reviewed the petition to quash third party summons filed by Petitioner Anthony James Floyd ("Petitioner"), as well as the papers filed in connection therewith, it appears the petition to quash (D.I. 2) should be DISMISSED for the reasons that follow:

         1. Background.

         Petitioner, who proceeds pro se, resides in Texas. On August 27, 2018, Internal Revenue Service Special Agent Robert De Los Santos served a third-party summons on Bank of America N.A., seeking records related to Petitioner's accounts with that institution. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the summons on the basis that it was issued without any legal authority or legitimate purpose and solely to harass him. (D.I. 2).

         2. Jurisdiction.

         Federal courts are obliged to address subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint because it lacks the power to hear the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Therefore, as a threshold matter, the Court must determine if subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (federal courts "have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party"); accord, Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 2011).

         3. "The United States and its agencies enjoy immunity from suit except insofar as Congress has enacted legislation effecting an unequivocal waiver." Upton v. I.R.S., 104 F.3d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1997). With regard to the instant case, under 26 U.S.C. § 7609, Congress created a discrete and limited waiver of that immunity solely for the purpose of permitting a taxpayer to "quash an administrative summons served on a third-party recordkeeper." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

         4. Service.

         Section 7609 authorizes and governs both the issuance of IRS summonses and petitions to quash summonses. Section 7609(b)(2) sets forth the proper procedure for quashing a third-party summons, as follows:

         (2) Proceeding to quash.-

(A) In general.- Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to quash such summons not later than the 20th day after the day such notice is given in the manner provided in subsection (a)(2). In any such proceeding, the Secretary may seek to compel compliance with the summons.
(B) Requirement of notice to person summoned and to Secretary.-lf any person begins a proceeding under subparagraph (A) with respect to any summons, not later than the close of the 20-day period referred to in subparagraph (A) such person shall mail by registered or certified mail a copy of the petition to the person summoned and to such office as the Secretary may direct in the notice referred to in subsection (a)(1).

26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2) (emphasis added). As set forth in the emphasized portion of the statute, a petitioner must serve by registered or certified mail a copy of the petition upon the person summoned and the IRS office designated by the Secretary within 20 days after notice of the summons. Id.

         5. Section 7609 is a conditional waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity and, therefore, courts must construe its requirements strictly. See Faber v. United States,921 F.2d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 1990). "Failure to comply with § 7609(b)(2)(B) is a jurisdictional defect." Wade v. Internal Revenue Serv.,208 F.3d ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.