United States District Court, D. Delaware
CHRISTIAN F. NEGRON, Plaintiff,
CITY OF WILMINGTON LAW DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
Christian F. Negron, Clifton, New Jersey, Pro se Plaintiff.
Holland, Esquire, City Solicitor's Office, City of
Wilmington, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.
CONNOLLY, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Christian F. Negron, ("Plaintiff") who appears
praise and has paid the filing fee, commenced this
employment discrimination action on the basis of race,
national origin, disability, and perceived disability
pursuant to the Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, as
amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1967, as amended
("Rehab Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et
seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
as amended, ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101,
et seq., on October 31, 2017. (D.I. 1) He filed an
amended complaint on December 27, 2017. (D.I. 6) Together,
they form the operative pleading. The Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Before the Court are
Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to strike
Plaintiff's sur-reply. (D.I. 9, 17). The matters have
was a probationary firefighter in the Wilmington Fire
Department's recruit academy, scheduled from November 17,
2014 to February 7, 2015. Named as defendants are numerous
individual employees as well as the City of Wilmington, its
Law Department, and its Fire Department. Plaintiff alleges
employment discrimination by reason of race, national origin,
disability and perceived disability occurred and termination
of employment on December 10, 2014. (D.I. 1, 6). Plaintiff
filed a charge of discrimination on March 11, 2015, and
received a notice of suit rights dated August 21, 2017. He
commenced this action on October 31, 2017 seeking
reinstatement, backpay, compensatory damages, and other
move for partial dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
on the grounds the complaint fails to state a valid claim
against the individual defendants, the City of Wilmington
Fire Department, and the City of Wilmington Legal Department.
reviewing a motion to dismiss filed under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in a
complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. A court may
consider the pleadings, public record, orders, exhibits
attached to the complaint, and documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
12(b)(6) motion maybe granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the complainant, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). "Though
'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a
complaint must do more than simply provide 'labels and
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.'" Davis v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court
is "not required to credit bald assertions or legal
conclusions improperly alleged in the complaint." In
re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d
198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002). A complaint may not be dismissed,
however, "for imperfect statement of the legal theory
supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of
Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 346 (2014).
complainant must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim
has "substantive plausibility." Id. at
347. That plausibility must be found on the face of the
complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
[complainant] pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the [accused] is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. Deciding
whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense." Id. at
move for dismissal of the Title VII, Rehab Act, and ADA
claims raised against individual Defendants Deputy Chief
Michael Donohue, Chief Anthony Goode, Captain John Looney,
Lieutenant Jeffrey Schall, City Solicitor, Bruno J.
Battaglia, Tanya Washington, Michael S. Purzycki, Charlotte
Barnes, and Dr. Olusey I. Senu-Oke.
VII, Rehab Act, and ADA do not provide for individual
liability. The law in this area is clear, and has been for
some time, that individual employees are not liable under
Title VII. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d
184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002); Cardenas v. Massey, 269
F.3d 251, 268 (3d Cir. 2001). In addition, the law is
well-established in the Third Circuit that parties cannot be
held liable in their individual capacities under the ADA or
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See A. W. v.
Jersey City Public Schools,486 F.3d 791, 804 (3d Cir.
2007) ("Suits may be brought pursuant to [the
Rehabilitation Act] against recipients of federal assistance,
but not against individuals."); Koslow v.
Pennsylvania,302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (no
individual liability under the ADA). Accordingly, the Court
will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Deputy Chief