United States District Court, D. Delaware
MATTHEW N.P. JONES, Plaintiff,
DR. ANIS AHMED and FELLOWSHIP HEALTH RESOURCES, Defendants.
Matthew N.P. Jones, Greenwood, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
ANDREWS, U.S. District Judge
Matthew Jones, who appears pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed
this action on September 5, 2018. (D.I. 2). He asserts
jurisdiction by reason of a federal question. The Court
screens the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). In addition, Plaintiff moves for my recusal.
alleges the acts complained of occurred from 2007 through
2010 and in 2018, but provides no specific dates. (D.I. 2 at
2). The allegations are similar to those raised in Civ. No.
17-394-RGA. Plaintiff spent four years (presumably 2007
through 2010) in a court-ordered program, administered by
Defendant Fellowship Health Resources, and under the care of
Defendant Dr. Ahmed. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges
that trials are held every month for court-ordered patients,
and during those four years he never received a trial date to
plead for his release. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges his
civil rights were violated because he was deprived of his
right to trial under the Sixth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §
9502, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Id.).
alleges that he is forced to take medications that are
unhealthy for his body. (Id.). He alleges this
violates federal criminal statutes. (Id.). Plaintiff
alleges that the side effects of the medications and
injections he was forced to take were not discussed with him,
and he was not provided with literature or alternative
options in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 95011 (C) i-vi.
(Id.). Plaintiff alleges that his "condition
was maliciously made," "a known falsehood,
schizophrenia. Symptoms of the disease were that [Plaintiff]
'delusionally' believe[s] that Linda C. Jones is not
[Plaintiff's] birth mother" in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1035. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that
schizophrenia can be detected by a brain scan, but Defendants
did not conduct a scan. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff
alleges that "on his own," he paid to scan his
brain for schizophrenia and other mental illness.
(Id.). The results indicate that he has a disease
free and healthy brain. (Id.).
alleges that the misdiagnosis and intolerable poisonings
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 6). He alleges the mental
health mistreatment coincide with life-long abuse, assault,
attempted murder and rape by the Sussex County Court System
and Delaware Attorney General's Office. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants' actions have prevented him
from owning a firearm in violation of the Second Amendment,
and Defendants falsified Plaintiff's records in violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment. (Id.). He alleges the
illegal activity of supervision and diagnosis of illiteracy
and insanity hinder his First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and religion. (Id.). Plaintiff invokes his
Seventh Amendment right to trial. (Id.).
alleges he has been injured from head to toe. (Id.
at 8). The antipsychotics given him have poisoned his body
and brain. (Id.). The reputation of a schizophrenic
man hinders his work and ability to find work.
(Id.). He seeks two billion dollars in damages.
(Id. at 8).
moves for my recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). (D.I. 5).
He claims that I have been abusive in denying him in
forma pauperis status and refusing to issue U.S. Marshal
service of summons and complaint in cases where he was
granted in forma pauperis status. Jones contends
that I set and hold him to deadlines, but do not hold his
opponents to any deadlines, including deadlines of default
judgment. He contends that even after evidence has been
provided, I have taken no action on his behalf. Thus,
Plaintiff contends that he remains kidnapped, raped, and
poisoned under a false identity, all in violation of his
First, Second, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights.
is required to recuse himself "in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test for recusal under §
455(a) is whether a "reasonable person, with knowledge
of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned," In re
Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir.
2004), not "whether a judge actually harbors bias
against a party," United States v. Kennedy, 682
F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012). Under § 455(b)(1), a judge
is required to recuse himself "[w]here he has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party."
either subsection, the bias necessary to require recusal
generally "must stem from a source outside of the
official proceedings." Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994); Selkridge v. United of Omaha
Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (beliefs
or opinions which merit recusal must involve an extrajudicial
factor). Hence, "judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
evident that Plaintiff takes exception to my prior rulings
and this serves as his basis to seek recusal. A reasonable,
well-informed observer could not believe that the rulings
were based on impartiality, bias, or actual prejudice by me.
Nor do my rulings demonstrate the Court acting in such manner
when ruling in the cases wherein Jones is a party. After
careful and deliberate consideration, the undersigned
concludes that the Court has no actual bias or prejudice
towards Jones and that a reasonable, well- informed observer
would not question the Court's impartiality. Considering
the foregoing standard and after considering Plaintiff's
assertions, I conclude that there are no grounds for my
recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Therefore, I will deny