United States District Court, D. Delaware
MATTHEW N.P. JONES, Plaintiff,
DELAWARE STATE POLICE HEADQUARTERS, Defendant.
Matthew N.P. Jones, Greenwood, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
ANDREWS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Matthew N.P. Jones, who appears pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed
this action on September 5, 2018. (D.I. 2). He appears
pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. He asserts jurisdiction by reason of a
federal question and a federal defendant. The Court
proceeds to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has also filed a motion to change
judge. (D.I. 5).
Complaint, Plaintiff raises claims under federal criminal
statutes and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The claims are
similar to those in other cases Plaintiff has filed in this
Court against different defendants. Plaintiff provides his
biography beginning at birth through adulthood. (D.I. 2 at
3-7). Plaintiff indicates that for the past thirteen years he
has had to deal with poisoning medications for a known
misdiagnosis of schizophrenia. (Id. at 7).
"Symptoms of the disease are that [Plaintiff]
'delusionally' believe[s] that Linda C. Jones is not
[Plaintiff's] birth mother" in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1035. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that
schizophrenia can be detected by a brain scan, but no one has
provided him one. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that
"on his own," he paid to scan his brain for
schizophrenia and other mental illness. (Id. at 8).
The results indicate that he has a disease free and healthy
brain. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges in 2017, he was
arrested at his home by the State Police and then forcibly
injected with antipsychotic drugs when he was transported to
an involuntary hospitalization. (Id.).
alleges he has been injured from head to toe. (Id.
at 9). He seeks ten billion dollars in damages.
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro
se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscherv. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a
complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave
to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable
or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
proceeds pro se and, therefore, his pleading is
liberally construed and his complaint, "however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6),
a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). "Though
'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a
complaint must do more than simply provide 'labels and
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.'" Davis v.
Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In
addition, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show
that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v.
City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint
may not be dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of
the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See
Id. at 346.
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court should
follow a three-step process: (1) consider the elements
necessary to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that are
merely conclusions and therefore are not well-pleaded factual
allegations; and (3) accept any well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and determine whether they plausibly
state a claim. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,
809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); Williams v. BASF
Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014).
Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a
"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
moves for my recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). (D.I. 5).
He claims that I have been abusive in denying him in
forma pauperis status and refusing to issue U.S. Marshal
service of summons and complaint in cases where he was
granted in forma pauperis status. Jones contends
that I set and hold him to deadlines, but do not hold his
opponents to any deadlines, including deadlines of default
judgment. He contends that even after evidence has been
provided, I have taken no action on his behalf. Thus,
Plaintiff contends ...