Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

States ex rel. Jenning v. Purdue Pharma L.P.

Superior Court of Delaware

February 4, 2019

STATE OF DELAWARE, ex rel. KATHLEEN JENNINGS, Attorney General of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff,

          Submitted: November 15, 2018

         Upon Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Strike

          Ryan P. Newell, Esq., Shaun Michael Kelly, Esq., Kyle Evans Gay, Esq., Connolly Gallagher, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Richard W. Fields, Esq., Fields PLLC, Washington, District of Columbia; Scott W. Gilbert, Esq., Richard Shore, Esq. (Argued), Mark A. Packman, Esq., Jenna A. Hudson, Esq. (Argued), Michael B. Rush, Esq. (Argued), Monique T. Abrishami, Esq., Richard J. Leveridge, Esq., Gilbert LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Michael Vild, Esq., Michelle Whalen, Esq., Delaware Department of Justice, Attorneys for the State of Delaware.

          Brian D. Tome, Esq., Kelly E. Rowe, Esq., Reilly, McDevitt, & Henrich, PC, Wilmington, Delaware; Mark S. Cheffo, Esq., Hayden A. Coleman, Esq. (Argued), Debra D. O'Gorman, Esq., Dechert LLP, New York, New York; Judy L. Leone, Esq., Dechert LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Defendant Purdue Pharma L.P. & The Purdue Frederick Company ("Purdue Pharma").

          Michael P. Kelly, Esq., Steven P. Wood, Esq., Daniel J. Brown, Esq., Hayley J. Reese, Esq., McCarter & English, Wilmington Delaware; John A. Freedman, Esq. (Argued), Arnold & Porter Kay Scholer LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; Sean O. Morris, Esq., Arnold & Porter Kay Scholer LLP, Los Angeles, California, Attorneys for Defendant Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. & Endo Health Solutions, Inc. ("Endo").

          Kevin B. Collins, Esq., Katherine B. Shaffer, Esq., Covington & Burling, Washington, District of Columbia; Neil K. Roman, Esq., Covington & Burling, New York, New York; A. Thompson Bayliss, Esq., Michael A. Barlow, Esq. (Argued), Sarah E. Delia, Esq., David A. Seal, Esq., Daniel J. McBride, Esq., Abrams & Bayliss, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant McKesson Corporation.

          David A. Felice, Esq., Bailey & Glasser LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Steven Pyser, Esq., Ashley W. Hardin, Esq. (Argued), Joshua D. Tully, Williams & Connolly, Washington, District of Columbia, Attorneys for Defendant Cardinal Health, Inc.

          Jennifer C. Wasson, Esq. (Argued), Jesse L. Noa, Esq., Carla M. Jones, Esq., Potter, Anderson, & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Louis W. Schack, Esq., Shannon E. McClure, Esq., Neil A. Hlawatsch, Esq., Reed Smith LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Defendant AmerisourceBergen Corporation.

          Jami B. Nimeroff, Esq., Brown, Garry, Nimeroff, Wilmington, Delaware; James W. Matthews, Esq. (Argued), Katy E. Koski, Esq., Jaclyn V. Piltch, Esq., Redi Kasollja, Esq., Foley & Lardner, Boston, Massachusetts, Attorneys for Defendant Anda Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

          Thomas E. Hanson, Esq., Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Oni N. Harton, Esq., Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Defendant H.D. Smith LLC.

          Daniel B. Rath, Esq., Rebecca L. Butcher, Esq., Jennifer L. Cree, Esq., Landis, Rath, & Cobb LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Eric R. Delinsky, Esq., Alexandra W. Miller, Esq., R. Miles Clark, Esq. (Argued), Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, Attorneys for Defendant CVS Health Corporation.

          Beth Moskow-Schnoll, Esq., William Burton, Esq., Elizabeth A. Sloan, Esq., Ballard Spahr LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Esq., Katherine M. Swift, Esq., Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar, & Scott LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Alex J. Harris, Esq., Bartlit, Beck, Herman, Palenchar, & Scott LLP, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc.

          HON. MARY M. JOHNSTON J.


         The State of Delaware ("State"), ex rel. Kathleen Jennings, [1] Attorney General of the State of Delaware, brought this suit seeking compensatory, punitive, and other damages, as well as restitution, disgorgement, and civil penalties. Defendants are: Purdue Pharma L.P., Purdue Pharma Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company, Endo Health Solutions Inc., and Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. (collectively, "Manufacturers"); McKesson Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., AmerisourceBergen Corporation, Anda Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and H. D. Smith, LLC (collectively, "Distributors"); and CVS Health Corporation and Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. (collectively, "Pharmacies").

         As to the Manufacturers, the State argues that Manufacturers have duties to disclose accurately the risks associated with opioid medications, specifically, the high risk of addiction and subsequent misuse. The State contends that Manufacturers misrepresented those risks through multi-million-dollar advertising campaigns, and inaccurately claimed that those who were showing signs of addiction were not actually addicted. The State argues that these misstatements were targeted for maximum effect and to a specific audience. The State contends that Manufacturers knew or should have known that their statements were false and misleading. Because they knew the statements were misleading, Manufacturers violated their duties to disclose accurately the risks of using purportedly highly dangerous opioid medications.

         As to Distributors, the State argues that Distributors have duties to actively prevent opioid diversion.[2] The State asserts that both Delaware and federal law have established the duties of care that Distributors must follow. The State argues that, as evidenced by prior regulatory actions against Distributors for failing to prevent diversion, Distributors have violated their duties.

         Similarly, as to Pharmacies, the State argues that Pharmacies have duties to prevent opioid diversion and to report any suspicious orders. The State alleges that Pharmacies repeatedly have failed to report suspicious orders made obvious to them by certain "red flags," such as unusually large orders, repetitive orders, and improperly filled orders. The State argues that Pharmacies have violated their duties owed to the State, as evidenced by prior regulatory actions against Pharmacies.

         The State argues that Defendants' collective misconduct has harmed and continues to harm the State of Delaware and its citizens.[3] The State alleges the following:

Count I: Consumer Fraud (Against Manufacturer Defendants)
Count II: Nuisance (Against Manufacturer Defendants)
Count III: Negligence (Against Manufacturer Defendants)
Count IV: Unjust Enrichment (Against Manufacturer Defendants)
Count V: Consumer Fraud (Against Distributor Defendants and Pharmacy Defendants)
Count VI: Nuisance (Against Distributor Defendants and Pharmacy Defendants)
Count VII: Negligence (Against Distributor Defendants and Pharmacy Defendants)
Count VIII: Unjust Enrichment (Against Distributor Defendants and Pharmacy Defendants)
Count IX: Civil Conspiracy (Against Manufacturer Defendants, Distributor Defendants, Pharmacy Defendants).

         Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss. Manufacturers joined together to file one Motion to Dismiss. Four of the five Distributors filed Motions to Dismiss: McKesson Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc. and AmerisourceBergen Corporation have jointly filed one motion. Anda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. has separately filed its own motion. The remaining distributor, H.D. Smith, LLC, has not joined in or filed its own motion to dismiss, but did answer the complaint. The Pharmacies jointly filed one motion to dismiss. Oral Argument was heard over two days: October 24, 2018 and November 15, 2018.


         In a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the Court must determine whether the claimant "may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof."[4] The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations.[5] Every reasonable factual inference will be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.[6]If the claimant may recover under that standard of review, the Court must deny the Motion to Dismiss.[7]



         The State contends that all Defendants violated statutory and common law duties, which caused injury to the State. The State's claims vary slightly as to each class of Defendant.


         State's Allegations

         The State argues that each Manufacturer Defendant has a legal obligation under Delaware statutory and common law to exercise reasonable care in the marketing, promotion, and sale of opioids. The State argues that Manufacturers' duties are established by 16 Del. C. § 3302, which states: "No person shall manufacturer, sell or trade in, within this State, any article of food or drugs which is . . . misbranded . . . within the meaning of this chapter."[8]

         The State argues that Manufacturers have breached their duties by misstating facts and by failing to disclose accurately the risks associated with the use of opioids. The State claims that Manufacturers have done this via a multi-million-dollar advertising campaign that is run through websites, promotional materials, live conferences, publications for doctors, and other vehicles. The State asserts that Manufacturers trained pharmaceutical salesmen to tell doctors that the risk of opioid addiction is less than 1%, which is contrary to Center for Disease Control ("CDC") findings that suggest that there are significant risks of serious opioid addiction and abuse. The CDC reports that about 26% of long term users experience problems with addiction or dependence.[9] The State claims although there are warning labels approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") on the bottles of medication, the content in the advertising campaign is inconsistent with those warning labels in that the advertising scheme significantly minimizes the risks.

         Further, the State argues that Manufacturers stated that patients who showed signs of addiction were not actually addicted to opioids. The State claims that Manufacturers published a physician education pamphlet which suggested that patients who showed signs of addiction were actually in need of more medication, a phenomenon Manufacturers refer to as "pseudoaddiction." The State argues that "pseudoaddiction," a term coined by a Manufacturer, is a concept rejected by the CDC because it lacks scientific evidence. The State claims that Manufacturers advocate for increasing dosages regardless of a patient's actual prescribed dosage. The State contends that, through their web content, Manufacturers actually encourage patients, who believe they have not been prescribed an adequate dose, to seek a different doctor who will prescribe them the dose they feel they require. The State asserts that Manufacturers claim there is no risk of addiction when the dosage is increased.

         The State argues that Manufacturers' conduct amounts to a breach of duty owed to the State.

         Manufacturers' Response

         Manufacturers argue first that the State's claims are preempted because the FDA has approved opioid medications for the treatment of pain. Manufacturers maintain that they have complied with the FDA's warning label requirements. Manufacturers argue that the State cannot impose a duty to alter FDA-approved medicine. Further, Manufacturers assert that courts repeatedly have held that state law claims are preempted where they would require a manufacturer to make statements about safety or efficacy that are inconsistent with what the FDA has required*

         Manufacturers also argue that the State has failed to allege causation. Manufacturers argue that the State has failed to identify any physician who heard the alleged misrepresentations and subsequently prescribed opioid medications in reliance on Manufacturers' statements. Manufacturers cite Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund, et al, v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP and Zeneca, Inc.[10] in support of their argument that simply pleading deceptive advertising to the public generally is insufficient.[11] Manufacturers assert that ultimately there is no connection between the alleged misstatements and the harm to the State. Any misstatement is simply too attenuated to establish causation. Manufacturers argue that there is no fraud on the market. Further, as third-party payors, Manufacturers cannot be forced to cover costs incurred by the State because the State is not an insurer.

         Manufacturers offer for support State of Sao Paulo of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co., [12] a case in which a municipality sought to recover medical expenses supposedly incurred as a result of its citizens' increased use of tobacco products.[13] Manufacturers ask the Court to adopt the reasoning in Sao Paulo, specifically that it would be "both unfair and unsound policy"[14] to allow a government to sue in its capacity as health care insurer or provider, and to pursue claims on which its injured citizens, had they sued directly, might not be entitled to recover. Manufacturers assert that this type of claim is something that the legislature should address and that the government should not be able to circumvent the burden of proving individual claims.

         This Court finds Sao Paulo distinguishable. The plaintiffs in Sao Paulo were foreign governments, not United States municipalities. As such, the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue as parens patriae.[15] The Court finds this distinction crucial in determining whether or not the State has standing in this case to sue in its capacity as parens patriae.

         In support of the lack of causation argument, Manufacturers cite Ashley County, Arkansas v. Pfizer Incorporated.[16] In Ashley, Arkansas counties brought an action against manufacturers and distributors of over-the-counter cold and allergy medications containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine.[17] The counties sought damages under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Arkansas crime victims civil liability statute, and under theories of public nuisance and unjust enrichment.[18] The court found that the defendants did not proximately cause plaintiffs' damages and dismissed the claim because "the Counties cite[d] no case, federal or state, that recognizes a cause of action available to a government entity to recover against pharmaceutical manufacturers for the legal sale of products containing pseudoephedrine based on the subsequent use of the product in the manufacture of methamphetamine."[19]

         Manufacturers also argue that the State has failed to allege injury. Manufacturers contend that the State has failed to identify any prescription received by a patient that ultimately caused injury to the State. Further, Manufacturers argue that the State is only able to make broad allegations as to all Manufacturers, and cannot single out any wrongdoing by any individual Manufacturer. Manufacturers also argue that the State's claims are barred by the derivative-injury rule, municipal cost recovery rule, and economic loss doctrine.

         The State Has Stated Prima Facie Claims Against Manufacturers

         The Court finds that the State has met the notice pleading requirements as to its claims against Manufacturers. Under Delaware's notice pleading requirements, a plaintiff need only "state a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."[20] The State has met this burden by putting the Manufacturers on notice of its claims of misrepresentations ("low risk" of addiction and understated risk) made in literature and during training. The State plead its claims with sufficient particularity to allow the case to move forward. The State's allegations of labeling inconsistent with FDA approvals ("pseudoaddiction," softening and minimization) are sufficient to survive dismissal on the grounds of federal preemption. Therefore, Manufacturers' Motion to Dismiss must be denied.


         State's Allegations

         The State argues that Distributors have common law, statutory, and regulatory duties to act reasonably as distributors of opioids. Specifically, the State claims that Distributors have a duty to prevent opioid diversion. The State cites several statutes and regulations which, it claims, establish relevant duties.[21]The State claims that the Delaware Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") "requires distributors of controlled substances to take precautions to ensure a safe system for distribution of controlled substances, including opioids, and to prevent diversion of those controlled substances into illegitimate channels."[22] The State claims that Delaware law has certain registration requirements for Distributors, and that in order to distribute in Delaware, the Distributors must "establish, maintain, and adhere to written policies and procedures for: identifying, records, and reporting losses or thefts" and have written policies for "reporting criminal or suspected criminal activities involving the inventory of a drug or drugs."[23] The State makes clear that it is not asserting a cause of action under these laws, but rather, is using the laws to argue that there are established, industry-wide duties.

         The State alleges that Distributors have the knowledge and expertise to identify issues relating to diversion and know how to minimize the risk of diversion. The State claims that Distributors have acknowledged these duties by making "statements assuring the public they recognize their duty to curb the opioid epidemic."[24] The State claims that despite acknowledging and understanding their duties to prevent diversion, Distributors have violated those duties. The State asserts that Distributors have failed to identify suspicious orders, [25] which could have led to the discovery and prevention of diversion.

         The Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") supposedly has provided guidance on how to deal with suspicious orders. Since 2006, the DEA has briefed pharmaceutical distributors regarding "legal, regulatory, and due diligence responsibilities."[26] The DEA has pointed out the "red flags distributors should look for to identify potential diversion."[27] The DEA provided further information at conferences and in subsequent publications. The State claims that because Distributors have been educated on drug diversion, they have been put on notice of the problem of opioid diversion and the solution. Despite being put on notice, Distributors allegedly failed to prevent or address this issue.

         The State argues that Distributors have negligently or recklessly allowed diversion. The State, as a basis for this allegation, points out that Distributors' conduct has resulted "numerous civil fines and other penalties recovered by government agencies - including actions by the DEA related to violations of the [Federal Controlled Substances Act]."[28] The State claims that Distributors have engaged in a consistent nationwide pattern and practice of illegally distributing opioids by allowing diversion to occur.

         In sum, the State claims that the Distributors had duties to prevent opioid diversion, acknowledged and understood those duties, and violated those duties, resulting in injury to the State.

         Distributors' Response

         Distributors argue that the State has failed to plead a cognizable injury under Delaware law. Distributors assert that the State cannot recover damages belonging to individuals who allegedly have been personally injured by opioid addiction. Distributors argue that the State cannot recover on the basis of these indirect injuries.[29] Distributors further argue that the State may not recover the costs of normal public services. In support of this position, Distributors cite Baker v. Smith & Wesson Corporation, [30]in which the Court stated: "[P]ublic expenditures made in the performance of governmental functions are not recoverable from a tortfeasor in the absence of a specific statute."[31]

         Distributors argue that the State has failed to allege a negligence claim. Specifically, Distributors argue that they do not owe a duty to the State to report or halt shipment of "suspicious" orders. Distributors maintain that there is no common law or statutory duty to report these orders. Distributors also contend that there is no duty to the State because the State is not the customer. Distributors claim that their duties are solely to their customer, the pharmacies. Distributors assert that they act merely as middlemen between manufacturers and pharmacies, and that their responsibility is to take and fill orders. Distributors claim that the State has failed to allege that Distributors made any specific misrepresentations to pharmacies.

         The State Has Stated Claims Against Distributors

         The Court finds that Distributors' duties are not limited to pharmacies. Pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2513:

(a) The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale, lease or advertisement of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is an unlawful practice... (emphasis added).

         Because the language of the statute contemplates general reliance, the Court finds that the State need not limit its claims to misrepresentations made directly to pharmacies.

         Drug diversion is a medical and legal concept involving the transfer of any legally prescribed controlled substance from the individual for whom it was prescribed to another person for any illicit use. The State claims that a purpose of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act is to prevent diversion, and under this statute, Distributors have a duty to prevent diversion. Distributors maintain that the State's claims are barred by the safe harbor provided in 6 Del. C. § 2513 which states:

(b) This section shall not apply:
(2) To any advertisement or merchandising practice which is subject to and complies with the rules and regulations, of and the statutes administered by, the Federal Trade Commission...

         The Court finds that whether or not Distributors complied with "rules and regulations" cannot be determined without further discovery. The Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Distributors fall within in this safe harbor provision at this stage in the litigation.

         Distributors rely on Baker[32] to support the proposition that a municipality may not recover for its citizens' injuries. In Baker, the Mayor of Wilmington, on behalf of the City, sued several handgun manufacturers.[33] The lawsuit was part of a nationwide effort to force the handgun industry to make its products safer and to reduce gun violence. The plaintiffs in Baker were not the direct victims of injuries caused by firearms. The Court in Baker considered whether the City of Wilmington could recover the costs of municipal services, including police work and emergency response, in the absence of claims brought by direct victims. The issue was "whether the common law prohibition on municipalities recovering costs from tortfeasors... is the law in Delaware."[34] The Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating that "the court will not twist a jury trial involving municipal costs into a wildly expensive referendum on handgun control. The Mayor and the City must find another means to their ends."[35]

         The Court finds that the municipal cost recovery rule does not apply in this case. In five separate courts, and in the multi-district federal litigation based in Ohio, judges have rejected the notion that the municipal cost recovery rule bars recovery for public costs. These courts reasoned that when the alleged conduct is ongoing and persistent (as opposed to a one-time event), the rule may be suspended. The Court finds that the conduct in this case is continuous. Thus, the municipal cost recovery rule does not apply.

         Under 16 Del. C. § 4733, manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies must register and be licensed in order to dispense opioid medications. The applicant must have an underlying professional license in the State. The Secretary of State may deny registration to an applicant if the Secretary "determines that the issuance of that registration would be inconsistent with the public interest."[36] The statute lists eight factors that the Secretary shall consider when determining whether an issuance of a registration would be inconsistent with the public interest:

(1) Maintenance of effective controls against diversion of controlled substances into other than legitimate medical, scientific or industrial channels;
(2) Compliance with applicable federal, state and local law, including but not limited to such requirements as having a license to practice as a practitioner or having documented training and continuing ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.