Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Amazon.Com Inc.

United States District Court, D. Delaware

January 29, 2019

AMAZON.COM, INC., Defendant.

          George Pazuniak, Sean T. O'Kelly, O'KELLY ERNST & JOYCE, LLC, Wilmington, DE Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

          David Ellis Moore, Stephanie E. O'Byrne, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON, LLP, Wilmington, DE

          Daniel T. Shvodian, PERKINS COIE LLP, Palo Alto, CA

          Bobbie J. Wilson, PERKINS COIE LLP, San Francisco, CA Attorneys for Defendant.



         Plaintiff Princeton Digital Image Corporation (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendant, Inc. (“Defendant”) on February 15, 2013, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4, 813, 056 (the “'056 Patent”). (D.I. 1) The patent-in-suit relates to encoding techniques for compressing digital data.

         Presently before the Court is the issue of claim construction. The parties completed briefing on October 15, 2018. (D.I. 52, 54, 56, 60, 64) The Court held a claim construction hearing on November 29, 2018. (D.I. 72) (“Tr”)



         The ultimate question of the proper construction of a patent is a question of law. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 837 (2015) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996)). “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction.” Id. at 1324. Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources “in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.” Id.

         “[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. . . . [which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. at 1312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.” Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). The patent “specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

         While “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms, ” the context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Furthermore, “[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment . . . . [b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

         It is likewise true that “[d]ifferences among claims can also be a useful guide . . . . For example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.” Id. at 1314-15 (internal citation omitted). This “presumption is especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim.” SunRace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

         It is also possible that “the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor's lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. It bears emphasis that “[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         In addition to the specification, a court “should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The prosecution history, which is “intrinsic evidence, ” “consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the [Patent and Trademark Office] and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. “[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id.

         “In some cases, . . . the district court will need to look beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva, 135 S.Ct. at 841. “Extrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. For instance, technical dictionaries can assist the court in determining the meaning of a term to those of skill in the relevant art because such dictionaries “endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. In addition, expert testimony can be useful “to ensure that the court's understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.” Id. Nonetheless, courts must not lose sight of the fact that “expert reports and testimony [are] generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.” Id. Overall, while extrinsic evidence “may be useful to the court, ” it is “less reliable” than intrinsic evidence, and its consideration “is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1318-19. Where the intrinsic record unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583).

         Finally, “[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It follows that “a claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor's device is rarely the correct interpretation.” Osram GmbH v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).


         A patent claim is indefinite if, “viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, [it fails to] inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). A claim may be indefinite if the patent does not convey with reasonable certainty how to measure a claimed feature. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But “[i]f such an understanding of how to measure the claimed [feature] was within the scope of knowledge possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art, there is no requirement for the specification to identify a particular measurement technique.” Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015).


         A. “Group” and “Grouping” [2]


n. an identifiable set of codewords based on conditions or values

v. identifying a set of codewords based on conditions or values


no construction necessary, but if necessary:

n. set of codewords organized together based on the encoding technique used v. organizing codewords into a set based on the encoding technique used


n. a plurality of codewords associated with one another by some unifying relationship

v. the act or process of organizing into groups

         The parties agree that the terms should be given their plain and ordinary meanings (Tr. at 5, 9) but, in the alternative, propose competing constructions (D.I. 52 at 5; D.I. 54 at 7). Given that the terms are used in their ordinary manner, the Court sees no reason to define the terms in any way other than their plain and ordinary meanings. However, the Court's definition specifically references “codewords” because it is undisputed that it is the codewords that are grouped, as opposed to signals or signal conditions. (See D.I. 52 at 5; D.I. 54 at 7)

         B. “codeword” [3]


No construction needed, but if needed: a digital value representation of a specific signal


A fundamental encoding unit that represents a signal condition


a digital value representation of a specific signal value or condition, wherein

a codeword is not a concatenation of other codewords

         At the onset, the Court sees no reason to introduce the vague language proposed by Defendant - “[a] fundamental encoding unit” - since “a digital value representation” accurately reflects the fact that the '056 Patent discusses using binary values for codewords. See '056 Patent, col. 1 ll. 1-2 (“This invention relates to encoders for encoding digital signals”) (emphasis added); Tables I-V (showing all codewords comprise binary values of 0s and 1s). Further, the parties agreed at oral argument that each codeword represents a different signal condition or value, rather than “a specific signal, ” as Plaintiff had initially proposed. (Tr. at 23, 29) Thus, the Court construes the term, in part, to mean “a digital value representation of a specific signal value or condition.”

         Such a construction has two implications. First, one codeword cannot refer to multiple signal conditions or values. See '056 Patent, col. 2 ll. 18-20 (stating that one prior art problem was “use [of] identical codewords representing different information signals”); col. 2 ll. 61-65 (“According to the present invention . . . each codeword represents a different signal condition in an information signal.”). Second, neither a “keyword” (or “prefix”), nor a “suffix codeword segment, ” alone constitutes a “codeword” because these do not represent a signal condition or value; only the combined keyword/prefix and suffix represent a ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.