United States District Court, D. Delaware
S1RENA RENEE POOLE, also known as Sirena Renee Permenter, Claimant,
MICHAEL P. MORTON, et al., Respondents.
Renee Poole, Middletown, Delaware. Pro Se Claimant.
ANDREWS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Sirena Renee Poole, also known as S'irena Renee
Permenter, proceeds pro se and has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. She filed this
action on October 15, 2018. Claimant invokes jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (patents, plant variety
protection, copyrights, mask works, designs, trademarks, and
unfair competition), and the petition refers to several
federal laws. (D.l. 2, 7). The Court proceeds to review and
screen the petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to 28
seeks a cease and desist order against Respondents attorneys
Michael P. Morton and David C. Zerbato "for certain
violations of the Investment Act of 1940, Employee Security
Company, RICO Act, False Claims Act, White Collar Crime,
Chapter 77 of Title 18, 18 U.S.C.A. 1584." (D.l. 7 at
2). The claims revolve around Claimant's eviction from
property where she was living after the property "went
through foreclosure," and the previous occupants left
the property and moved to another state. (D.l. 2 at 4).
April 2018, Service Link Company was hired to maintain and
winterize the property, and it placed a sticker on the door
that the property was vacant/abandoned. (Id.).
Claimant called Service Link to inquire about the property
and entered into a verbal agreement to occupy and maintain
the premises and to record a deed. (Id. at 4, 6).
Two weeks later, two men told Claimant they had purchased the
property. (Id. at 4-5). A week later, Claimant was
approached by Keller Williams Broker and, after that,
received two more visits from "two other undisclosed
men." (Id. at 5).
17, 2018, Claimant filed a quitclaim deed that purported to
convey the property in question from Claimant to Claimant and
two others. (D.l. 2 at Ex. B). The Court takes judicial
notice that on August 2, 2018, a landlord tenant action was
filed in the New Castle County Justice of the Peace Court by
Judy Fisher against Claimant, C.A. No. JP9-18-002015. Fisher
was represented by Respondents Morton and Zerbato. (D.l. 2 at
Ex. C). On September 10, 2018, Claimant was advised it had
been determined that the deed was filed in error, and it was
removed from the record by the New Castle County Recorder of
Deeds. (Id.). Claimant was further advised that
Fisher and Katherine J. Bannon are the joint owners of record
of the property. (Id.).
September 17, 2018, Claimant filed a notice of registration
under Section 8(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
(Id. at 4). On September 21, 2018, two men dressed
as Delaware State Police Agents assisted in evicting Claimant
from the property. (Id. at 5). On September 26,
2018, Zerbato advised the Justice of the Peace Court that he
was dismissing the landlord/tenant action without prejudice.
(D.l. 2 at Ex. C). Claimant alleges the matter was dismissed
because Respondents did not effect proper service as they
failed to serve the registered agent as listed on the notice
of registration. (D.l. 2 at 5).
alleges she has a vested interest in the property and was
ousted from it. (Id. at 5-6). She seeks summary
possession of the property. (D.l. 7 at 7).
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court must accept all
factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in
the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229
(3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007). Because Claimant proceeds pro se, her
pleading is liberally construed and her petition,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94.
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a
complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of
28 U.S.C. §1915, the Court must grant Claimant leave to
amend her complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544
(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that
a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City
of Shelby, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A
complaint may riot dismissed, ...