United States District Court, D. Delaware
Thomas Kennedy, Breinigsville, Pennsylvania. Pro Se
ANDREWS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Edward Thomas Kennedy proceeds pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This
action was commenced on August 24, 2018, and invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court by reason of diversity of
citizenship of the parties. (D.I. 2 at 2). The Court proceeds
to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has sued
AT&T and its officers and directors, Ernst & Young
LLP and its officers and directors, and numerous attorneys.
The Complaint contains ten counts, titled as follows: Count
One, Trespass; Count Two, Trespass on the Case; Count Three,
Trespass on the Case-Vicarious Liability; Count Four, Failure
to Provide a Republican Form of Government; Count Five,
Action of Trover; Count Six, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress; Count Seven, Breach of Contract; Count
Eight, Defamation; Count Nine, Fraud Material Omission; and
Count Ten, Violation of Whistleblower Retaliation Provisions.
alleges that each Defendant either directly, through an
agent, or in concert with another caused him to be unlawfully
injured against his will. (D.I. 2 at 3). Plaintiff alleges
that from the moment he was harmed, until present, he was
kept in constructive financial imprisonment. (Id. at
4). Plaintiff alleges that he is, and was, a whistleblower.
(Id.). He alleges Defendants caused his unlawful
loss of liberty and affected his good reputation and ability
to earn a living. (Id. at 5). He alleges Defendants
lied, misled, misconstrued, misrepresented and filed false
paperwork on reports to federal agencies, commissions and
agents of the U.S. government. (Id.).
alleges State and Federal agencies "deregulated
regulated inside wire assets of AT&T, Inc., through fire
walls, but/and neglected to enforce their rules for 40
years." (Id. at 7). He alleges this allowed
Defendants Ginn and Stephenson to steal assets and/or cash
from "we the people" for personal gain.
(Id.). When Plaintiff complained to Ginn, he
retaliated, injured and damaged Plaintiff, breached
Plaintiffs contract promise of a career, damaged his good
name, and obstructed his ability to earn a living in
violation of whistleblower retaliation provisions.
alleges that Ginn and AT&T stole his trade secrets.
(Id. at 8). He further alleges that AT&T
promised him a career and job security after legal and
ethical violations by its corporate officers. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Ginn breached the contract, stole
Plaintiff's trade secrets, and forced Plaintiff
"into mind control torture or so-called 'Krone
Training,' and/or 'Kroning' and/or
'leadership Development' that caused [his] emotional
distress." (Id.). Plaintiff alleges his family
name - Kennedy - was stolen without permission or authority,
explaining he is part of the "Kennedy family bloodline
with a common law copyright of the name, kennedy for hundreds
of years." (Id. at 9).
alleges that Ginn and AT&T breached the contract
concerning Plaintiffs career. (Id.). He alleges
Defendants defamed and injured him by fraud. (Id. at
9-10). Finally, he alleges all individual directors violated
whistleblower retaliation provisions.(Id. at 10).
seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro
se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a
complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave
to amend ...