United States District Court, D. Delaware
WAYNE T. GAMBLE, Plaintiff,
MASSACHUSETTS STATE CAPITOL POLICE, et al, Defendants.
T. Gamble, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Wayne T. Gamble ("Plaintiff) filed this action on March
15, 2017. (D.I. 2) He appears pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4)
He asserts jurisdiction by reason of a United States
government defendant. The Court proceeds to review and screen
the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
as defendants are the Massachusetts State Capitol Police
("Capitol Police"), Buzzard Gut and Buzzard Bay
State Police ("State Police"), and the United
States Post Office ("USPS"). Plaintiff alleges that
the Capitol Police and Massachusetts State troopers "are
messing with computer and phone" and giving Plaintiff
the wrong phone number and addresses so that he will not send
them a letter. (D.I. 2) Plaintiff alleges that, since 2011,
the Capitol Police and the Massachusetts State trooper broke
the law and committed a crime by stealing money and property
and holding Danny Gamble and Kenny Gamble illegally, past
their time. He alleges that the Capitol Police and State
troopers are trying to kill Danny and Kenny Gamble, they are
holding them against the law, and that they lied and stole
money from Delaware banks.
alleges that those involved or who are witnesses include the
State of Delaware, WSFS Bank, Citizen's Bank, Delaware
State trooper, Virginia State Capitol, Georgia State Capitol
Police, DeKalb (Georgia) police, United States Army and Navy,
"whole wide world media and citizens people," north
and south federal agents, D.C. Federal Court, and the State
of Delaware Supreme Court and Superior Court. Plaintiff
alleges that he is homeless, and he seeks $899, 000, 000, 000
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro
se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because
Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally
construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint
or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, the Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though "detailed
factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must
do more than simply provide "labels and
conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action." Davis v. Abington
Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306,
315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that
a claim has substantive plausibility. See
Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct.
346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed for imperfect
statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.
See Id. at 346.
the pleading regime established by Twombly and
Iqbal a court reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2)
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and
(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts
in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is
plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Id.