United States District Court, D. Delaware
In re THOMAS E. NOBLE, Movant.
CHIEF JUDGE LEONARD STARK, et al., Respondents. THOMAS E. NOBLE, Petitioner,
HONORABLE LEONARD P. STARK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Thomas E. Noble ("Movant"), a pro se
litigant incarcerated at FDC Philadelphia has engaged in
filing numerous lawsuits that contain frivolous legal
arguments that are vexatious and abuse the judicial
process. On September 13, 2004, then United States
District Judge Kent A. Jordan entered an order enjoining
Movant from riling any pro se civil rights
complaints without prior approval of the Court. See Noble
v. Becker, Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ D.I. 12. In Noble v.
Becker, Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ, Movant was given notice to
show cause why injunctive relief should not issue, see
Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987);
he responded to the show cause order, but "did not show
cause" why the order should not be entered (see
Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ D.I. 7, D.I. 12 at 4). The barring order
issued, and Movant did not appeal. In 2016, Movant sought
mandamus relief to vacate the riling injunction and, when it
was denied, appealed to the Third Circuit. On October 6,
2016, the Third Circuit held that Movant was not entitled to
mandamus relief vacating the district court's riling
injunction, and he was not entided to a writ of mandamus for
review of the district court's enforcement of the filing
injunction. In re Noble, 663 Fed.Appx. at 190.
29, 2018, Movant filed a petition to stop traitors from
further serially robbing him of his constitutional right to
be heard by an impartial court and all other rights since
1982. (D.I. 3) The petition is construed as alleging
violations of Movant's civil rights.
Movant once again contests the order enjoining him from
filing civil rights complaints without prior court approval.
He claims the order has no legitimate force. Movant has
raised this claim previously and repeatedly, to no avail.
See In re Noble, 663 Fed.Appx. 188 (3d Cir. Oct. 6,
2016) (per curiam); In Re Thomas E. Noble
Litigation, 223 F.Supp.3d 1332 (U.S.J.P.M.L. 2016);
In re Noble, 2018 WL 2012903 (D. Del. Apr. 30,
2018); Noble v. Becker, 2017 WL 337979 (D.
Del. Jan. 23, 2017); In re Noble, 2016 WL 3693742
(D. Del. July 11, 2016); In re Noble, 2016 WL
3566983 (D. Del. June 29, 2016).
filing's caption notes that it is a miscellaneous action.
Named Respondents include current and retired Delaware
District Court Judges, United States Court of Appeals Judges,
and the Clerk of Court. The caption contains a "notice
of conflicts" requiring transmission of all cases to the
Supreme Court for reassignment to an impartial court. Movant
asserts that Respondents cannot ethically address or assign
this petition for reasons alleged and affirmed by him in
Movant contends that all named Respondent judges are
conflicted from hearing this matter and, as a result, this
requires the transmission of all of Movant's cases to the
United States Supreme Court for reassignment to an impartial
judge. In essence, Movant seeks the recusal of any and all
judges who have had contact of any type with any case in
which Movant has been involved.
judge is required to recuse himself "in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test for
recusal under § 455(a) is whether a "reasonable
person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
" In re Kensington Int'l, Ltd, 368 F.3d
289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004), not "whether a judge actually
harbors bias against a party, " United States v.
Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012). Under §
455(b)(1), a judge is required to recuse himself
"[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
Under either subsection, the bias necessary to require
recusal generally "must stem from a source outside of
the official proceedings." Uteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994); Selkridge v.
United of"Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167
(3d Cir. 2004) (beliefs or opinions which merit recusal must
involve extrajudicial factor). Hence, "judicial rulings
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion." Uteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
Similarly, claims of bias or partiality cannot be based on
"expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance,
[or] even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect
men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal
judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at
courtroom administration - even a stern and short-tempered
judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration -
remain immune." Id. at 555-56.
petition alleges a conspiracy of traitors who are puppets of
the Illuminati and who have been serially working in a common
scheme conspiracy to unconstitutionally deprive Movant of his
rights. The petition alleges this has occurred by obstructing
Movant's right to impartial court relief for well over
three decades since 1982. The petition provides a chronology
of events beginning in late 1981 and continuing through 2018.
(D.I. 3 at 3-5) The petition alleges in a conclusory manner
that Judges Robinson, Stark, Andrews, and Sleet colluded to
cover up and abet crimes by Delaware officials. (Id.
at 5) Movant seeks an impartial court to "peruse
completely all [his] cases" at said courts.
is evident that Movant takes exception to any and all rulings
made in this Court, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, and Delaware and Pennsylvania State
Courts. It is clear that the rulings serve as his only basis
to seek recusal.
undersigned Judge has been assigned this case through this
Court's ordinary procedures. A reasonable, well-informed
observer could not believe that the Court's prior rulings
in Movant's cases were based on impartiality, bias, or
actual prejudice. Nor do the Court's rulings demonstrate
that the undersigned Judge acted in such manner when ruling
in the cases wherein Movant is a party. After careful and
deliberate consideration, the undersigned Judge has concluded
that he has no actual bias or prejudice towards Movant and
that a reasonable, well-informed observer would not question
the Court's impartiality. In light of the foregoing
standard and after considering Movant's assertions, the
undersigned concludes that there are no grounds for recusal
under 28 U.S.C. § 455. See Azubuko v. Royal,
443 F.3d at 304 (mere fact that judge may be one of numerous
federal judges that litigant has filed suit against is not
sufficient to establish that recusal is warranted under 28
U.S.C. § 144 or § 455(a)).
Movant does not explain why he should be given leave to
commence a new action. However, it is clear from his filing
that Movant takes exception to judicial rulings and his
displeasure forms the basis of his claims. In addition, it is
clear from the pleading that the vast majority of the
allegations are time-barred. The remaining ...