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In re Noble

United States District Court, D. Delaware

June 11, 2018

In re THOMAS E. NOBLE, Movant.
CHIEF JUDGE LEONARD STARK, et al., Respondents. THOMAS E. NOBLE, Petitioner,



         1. Introduction.

         Movant Thomas E. Noble ("Movant"), a pro se litigant incarcerated at FDC Philadelphia has engaged in filing numerous lawsuits that contain frivolous legal arguments that are vexatious and abuse the judicial process.[1] On September 13, 2004, then United States District Judge Kent A. Jordan entered an order enjoining Movant from riling any pro se civil rights complaints without prior approval of the Court. See Noble v. Becker, Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ D.I. 12. In Noble v. Becker, Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ, Movant was given notice to show cause why injunctive relief should not issue, see Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987); he responded to the show cause order, but "did not show cause" why the order should not be entered (see Civ. No. 03-906-KAJ D.I. 7, D.I. 12 at 4). The barring order issued, and Movant did not appeal. In 2016, Movant sought mandamus relief to vacate the riling injunction and, when it was denied, appealed to the Third Circuit. On October 6, 2016, the Third Circuit held that Movant was not entitled to mandamus relief vacating the district court's riling injunction, and he was not entided to a writ of mandamus for review of the district court's enforcement of the filing injunction. In re Noble, 663 Fed.Appx. at 190.

         2. Discussion.

         On May 29, 2018, Movant filed a petition to stop traitors from further serially robbing him of his constitutional right to be heard by an impartial court and all other rights since 1982. (D.I. 3) The petition is construed as alleging violations of Movant's civil rights.

         3. Movant once again contests the order enjoining him from filing civil rights complaints without prior court approval. He claims the order has no legitimate force. Movant has raised this claim previously and repeatedly, to no avail. See In re Noble, 663 Fed.Appx. 188 (3d Cir. Oct. 6, 2016) (per curiam); In Re Thomas E. Noble Litigation, 223 F.Supp.3d 1332 (U.S.J.P.M.L. 2016); In re Noble, 2018 WL 2012903 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2018); Noble v. Becker, 2017 WL 337979 (D. Del. Jan. 23, 2017); In re Noble, 2016 WL 3693742 (D. Del. July 11, 2016); In re Noble, 2016 WL 3566983 (D. Del. June 29, 2016).

         4. The filing's caption notes that it is a miscellaneous action. Named Respondents include current and retired Delaware District Court Judges, United States Court of Appeals Judges, and the Clerk of Court. The caption contains a "notice of conflicts" requiring transmission of all cases to the Supreme Court for reassignment to an impartial court. Movant asserts that Respondents cannot ethically address or assign this petition for reasons alleged and affirmed by him in other cases.

         5. Movant contends that all named Respondent judges are conflicted from hearing this matter and, as a result, this requires the transmission of all of Movant's cases to the United States Supreme Court for reassignment to an impartial judge. In essence, Movant seeks the recusal of any and all judges who have had contact of any type with any case in which Movant has been involved.

         6. A judge is required to recuse himself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a "reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, " In re Kensington Int'l, Ltd, 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004), not "whether a judge actually harbors bias against a party, " United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 258 (3d Cir. 2012). Under § 455(b)(1), a judge is required to recuse himself "[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party."

         7. Under either subsection, the bias necessary to require recusal generally "must stem from a source outside of the official proceedings." Uteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994); Selkridge v. United of"Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (beliefs or opinions which merit recusal must involve extrajudicial factor). Hence, "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Uteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Similarly, claims of bias or partiality cannot be based on "expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, [or] even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration - even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration - remain immune." Id. at 555-56.

         8. The petition alleges a conspiracy of traitors who are puppets of the Illuminati and who have been serially working in a common scheme conspiracy to unconstitutionally deprive Movant of his rights. The petition alleges this has occurred by obstructing Movant's right to impartial court relief for well over three decades since 1982. The petition provides a chronology of events beginning in late 1981 and continuing through 2018. (D.I. 3 at 3-5) The petition alleges in a conclusory manner that Judges Robinson, Stark, Andrews, and Sleet colluded to cover up and abet crimes by Delaware officials. (Id. at 5) Movant seeks an impartial court to "peruse completely all [his] cases" at said courts. (Id.)

         9. It is evident that Movant takes exception to any and all rulings made in this Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Delaware and Pennsylvania State Courts. It is clear that the rulings serve as his only basis to seek recusal.

         10. The undersigned Judge has been assigned this case through this Court's ordinary procedures. A reasonable, well-informed observer could not believe that the Court's prior rulings in Movant's cases were based on impartiality, bias, or actual prejudice. Nor do the Court's rulings demonstrate that the undersigned Judge acted in such manner when ruling in the cases wherein Movant is a party. After careful and deliberate consideration, the undersigned Judge has concluded that he has no actual bias or prejudice towards Movant and that a reasonable, well-informed observer would not question the Court's impartiality. In light of the foregoing standard and after considering Movant's assertions, the undersigned concludes that there are no grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d at 304 (mere fact that judge may be one of numerous federal judges that litigant has filed suit against is not sufficient to establish that recusal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455(a)).

         10. Movant does not explain why he should be given leave to commence a new action. However, it is clear from his filing that Movant takes exception to judicial rulings and his displeasure forms the basis of his claims. In addition, it is clear from the pleading that the vast majority of the allegations are time-barred. The remaining ...

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