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Aranga v. Krapf

United States District Court, D. Delaware

March 19, 2018

DEBORAH J. ARANGA, Plaintiff,
v.
DALLAS KRAPF, et al., Defendants.

          Deborah J. Aranga, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

          Paula C. Witherow, Esquire, Cooch and Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          STARK, U.S. Distritt Judge

         I. INTRODUCTION

         Plaintiff Deborah J. Aranga ("Plaintiff), who proceeds pro se and was granted in forma pauperis status, filed this employment discrimination action on January 5, 2017, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et sea. (D.I. 2) The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Presently before the Court are Defendants' motion to dismiss (D.L 9) and Plaintiffs request for counsel (D.I. 13).

         II. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff was employed by Advanced Student Transportation, Inc. as a bus driver. She alleges discrimination by reason of a disability, occurring on March 21, 2016 and May 2, 2016. Her employment was terminated as of May 2, 2016 for job abandonment. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination on October 4, 2016 and received a notice of suit rights on October 12, 2016. She commenced this action on January 5, 2017. Named as defendants are Dallas Krapf and Dale Krapf as owners of Advanced Student Bus Transportation.[1] Plaintiff seeks back pay and reinstatement.

         III. LEGAL STANDARDS

         Evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig. 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court may grant such a motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See Id. at 346.

         "To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).'" Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At bottom, "[t]he complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element" of a plaintiffs claim. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         The Court is not obligated to accept as true "bald assertions, " Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, " Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997), or allegations that are "self-evidentiy false, " Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Brickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         IV. DISCUSSION

         Defendants move for dismissal of individual defendants Dallas Krapf and Dale Krapf on the grounds that the ADA does allow for ...


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