United States District Court, D. Delaware
DEBORAH J. ARANGA, Plaintiff,
DALLAS KRAPF, et al., Defendants.
Deborah J. Aranga, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
C. Witherow, Esquire, Cooch and Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware.
Counsel for Defendants.
U.S. Distritt Judge
Deborah J. Aranga ("Plaintiff), who proceeds pro
se and was granted in forma pauperis status,
filed this employment discrimination action on January 5,
2017, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, as amended ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§
12101, et sea. (D.I. 2) The Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Presently before the Court
are Defendants' motion to dismiss (D.L 9) and Plaintiffs
request for counsel (D.I. 13).
was employed by Advanced Student Transportation, Inc. as a
bus driver. She alleges discrimination by reason of a
disability, occurring on March 21, 2016 and May 2, 2016. Her
employment was terminated as of May 2, 2016 for job
abandonment. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination on
October 4, 2016 and received a notice of suit rights on
October 12, 2016. She commenced this action on January 5,
2017. Named as defendants are Dallas Krapf and Dale Krapf as
owners of Advanced Student Bus Transportation. Plaintiff seeks
back pay and reinstatement.
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig. 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court may grant such a
motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and
viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna,
Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to
show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See
Johnson v. City of Shelby ___U.S.___, 135 S.Ct.
346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed, however, for
imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim
asserted. See Id. at 346.
survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege
facts that 'raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).'" Victaulic
Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is facially
plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At bottom, "[t]he
complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each]
necessary element" of a plaintiffs claim. Wilkerson
v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Court is not obligated to accept as true "bald
assertions, " Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted), "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted
inferences, " Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417
(3d Cir. 1997), or allegations that are "self-evidentiy
false, " Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 69 (3d
Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her
pleading is liberally construed and her Complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Brickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
move for dismissal of individual defendants Dallas Krapf and
Dale Krapf on the grounds that the ADA does allow for