United States District Court, D. Delaware
SIPCO and IP Co. filed a complaint against Defendants
Streetline, Inc. and Kapsch Trafficcom Holding Corp. alleging
infringement often patents. (D.I. 1). Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (D.I. 7),
which I granted. (D.I. 15). I gave Plaintiffs leave to amend,
and Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint
("FAC"). (D.I. 16). The FAC added Kapsch Trafficcom
U.S. Corp. as a third defendant, assertions of indirect
infringement, and a detailed description of the accused
product. (See id.). Defendants again moved to
dismiss. (D.I. 18). I granted that motion. (D.I. 24). I again
gave Plaintiffs leave to amend, and Plaintiffs filed the
Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). (D.I. 25).
Defendants moved to dismiss in part the SAC. (D.I. 30). I now
consider that motion.
adds ten new claim charts, which appear to show how the
accused products meet each limitation of the asserted claims
of the ten patents-in-suit. (D.I. 26, Exhs. 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20).
Kapsch Trafficcom Holding Corp. and Kapsch Trafficcom U.S.
Corp. ("Kapsch") argue the SAC fails to state
claims against them for direct or induced infringement. (D.I.
31 at 7). Defendant Streetline argues the SAC fails to state
a claim against it for induced infringement. (Id.).
names some of the component parts of the parking system with
some specificity. (D.I. 25 ¶¶ 18, 19, 20). The SAC
makes clear that the products at issue are Streetline
products, and that Kapsch's involvement as defendants
grows out of their 2015 acquisition of Streetline.
(Id. ¶ 5). Streetline is now a wholly-owned
subsidiary of one of the Kapsch Defendants. (Id.).
claims of direct infringement against Kapsch, I do not think
the SAC meets the Twomblyllqbal pleading standard.
In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege Kapsch "ha[s] directly
infringed [the patents-at-issue] by either offering to sell
and selling the Streetline system cited above in reference to
infringement by Defendant Streetline." (D.I. 25
¶¶ 31, 40, 47, 53, 65, 71, 77, 83, 89; see also
Id. ¶ 59). In some circumstances, this might be
enough, but here the SAC makes clear that it is
Streetline's product. Thus, the allegation that
Streetline's corporate relatives also sell the product is
sufficiently inconsistent with the other allegations as to
require some factual assertions to make the allegation
"plausible." The only factual support for the
allegation that Kapsch "offers to sell, or sells"
the patented inventions is the Kapsch website, which states,
"Our offerings include .. . ." (Id.
¶¶ 23, 24). The website goes on to list parking
solutions, including sensors and parking space management.
(Id.). Above the heading, "Our offerings
include, " is a short paragraph related to Kapsch's
acquisition of Streetline. (Id. ¶ 23).
opinion, these facts are insufficient to allow the Court to
draw a "reasonable inference" that Kapsch is liable
for offering to sell or selling the patented inventions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). In other words, I do not think the fact that
Kapsch's website states "[o]ur offerings include,
" without more, supports an inference that Kapsch is
manifesting a willingness to enter into a bargain with a
prospective customer. See Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi
Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (defining
"offer to sell" in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
"according to the norms of traditional contractual
analysis"). Nothing on the website provided in the SAC
suggests one could purchase any of the listed parking
solutions from Kapsch. Similarly, there are no facts alleged
in the SAC supporting the inference that Kapsch
"sells" or has sold the patented inventions. Thus,
I am dismissing the SAC as to claims of direct infringement
the claim of induced infringement against Streetline, I
similarly do not think the SAC meets the Twomblyl
Iqbal pleading standard. In applying that standard, the
Federal Circuit has held that in order for a claim of induced
infringement to survive a motion to dismiss, the
"complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that
[Defendants] specifically intended their customers to
infringe the [asserted patents] and knew that the
customer's acts constituted infringement." In re
Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent
Litig, 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see
also Id. ("Liability under § 271(b) requires
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement." (quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc.
v. SEBS.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011))). It is not
sufficient for the complaint to contain only a
"formulaic recitation" of the elements of an
inducement claim. See Id. at 1346 (quoting Bell
Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)).
case, the sole allegation of induced infringement against
Streetline appears in Count II of the SAC. That Count alleges
that Streetline "has infringed and continues to infringe
. .. by intentionally inducing persons to practice the
patented method of claim 11 [of the '496 patent] through
implementation and use of Streetline Equipment in combination
with one or more of the Streetline Programs. Defendant
Streetline is thus liable for indirect infringement pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)." (D.I. 25 ¶ 39). It
consists of nothing more than a bare recitation of the legal
elements of an inducement claim. The SAC contains no facts to
support the allegation that Streetline had specific intent to
induce infringement. I am therefore dismissing the SAC as to
the claim of induced infringement against
counts also allege induced infringement against Kapsch. But
the allegations against Kapsch are just as formulaic as they
are in the one allegation of induced infringement against
Streetline. Other than providing a portion of the Kapsch
website, which lists certain parking solutions, the SAC
contains no facts to support the allegation that Kapsch
specifically intended others to infringe Plaintiffs patents.
Therefore, for the same reasons, I am dismissing the SAC as
to claims of induced infringement against Kapsch.
reasons stated above, Defendants' motion to dismiss in
part the SAC (D.I. 30) is GRANTED.
Defendants' motion for additional time to respond (D.I.
27) is therefore DISMISSED as moot.
 Because I find the SAC fails to
adequately plead the mental state required for a claim of
induced infringement, I need not reach or consider
Defendants' additional argument that Plaintiffs'
inducement allegations are deficient because they fail to