United States District Court, D. Delaware
KAMILLA DENISE LONDON, Aka Jesus L. Pinkston, Petitioner,
v.
DANA METZGER, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.[1]
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SLEET,
DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending
before the court is petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("petition")
filed by petitioner Kamilla Denise London
("London"). (D.I. 3) The State filed an answer in
opposition. (D.I. 9) For the following reasons, the court
will deny the petition as barred by the one-year limitations
period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
I.
BACKGROUND
In May
2011, London pled guilty to manslaughter (as a
lesser-included offense of second degree murder), leaving the
scene of a collision resulting in death, and first degree
reckless endangering. (D.I. 9 at 2) On July 29, 2011, the
Superior Court sentenced London to a total of thirty-two
years at Level V imprisonment, suspended after twenty-five
years, for decreasing levels of supervision. (D.I. 11 at
142-143) London did not file a direct appeal.
On
October 26, 2011, London filed a motion for modification of
sentence, which the Superior Court denied on December 9,
2011. (D.I. 11 at 5) London did not appeal that decision.
On June
6, 2012, London filed a pro se motion for correction
of an illegal sentence, which the Superior Court granted on
June 20, 2012. (D.I. 9 at 2; D.I. 11 at 5) As a result, the
Superior Court modified the effective date of London's
sentence from July 29, 2011 to the correct date of May 3,
2010. (D.I. 9 at 2)
On July
11, 2012, London field a pro se motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion), which the Superior
Court denied on November 13, 2013. (D.I. 11 at 5, 9); see
State v. Pinkston, 2013 WL 3819637, at *12 (Del. Super.
Ct. July 22, 2013). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that
decision on August 28, 2014. See Pinkston, 2013 WL
3819637, at *3.
In
March 2015, London filed in this court a habeas petition
asserting the following four grounds for relief: (1) the
Superior Court performed a deficient plea colloquy; (2) the
Superior Court's harsh sentence was based on
impermissible factors; (3) defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to file a direct appeal;
and (4) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to share the results of London's psychological
evaluation when deciding whether to plead guilty or not.
(D.I. 3) The State filed an answer asserting that the
petition should be denied as time-barred or, alternatively,
because the claims are procedurally barred. (D.I. 9)
II.
ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") was signed into law by the President on
April 23, 1996, and habeas petitions filed in federal courts
after this date must comply with the AEDPA's
requirements. See generally Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320, 336 (1997). AEDPA prescribes a one-year period of
limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by state
prisoners, which begins to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
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