United States District Court, D. Delaware
DAVID A. ALLEMANDI, a/k/a Hermione Kelly Ivy Winter, Plaintiff,
HYDE, et al., Defendants.
A. Allemandi, a/k/a Hermione Kelly Ivy Winter, James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se
David A. Allemandi, a/k/a Hermione Kelly Ivy Winter
("Plaintiff'), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 2) She appears pro
se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (D.I. 7) The Court proceeds to review and
screen the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)
April 9, 2014, Plaintiff pled guilty to second degree rape
and continuous sexual abuse of a child. See Allemandi v.
State, No. 549, 2015 (Del.) at BL-36 (appendix
containing State v. Allemandi, CRA # S13-09-0783
thru 0788, ID No. 1308015125, Apr. 9, 2014 plea agreement,
Apr. 9, 2014 change of plea transcript, Apr. 10, 2014
sentencing transcript). Plaintiff, who is a participant in
the Transitions Sex Offenders Program, alleges that the
program violates her Fifth Amendment right to be free from
self-incrimination and her Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.
alleges that participation in the program is mandatory and
requires mandatory disclosure of information regarding past
behavior, including past convictions and uncharged offenses.
She also alleges that, because the information disclosed does
not remain confidential, this encourages rape, physical
abuse, mental abuse, triggers "to reoffend, " and
"fear for life." (D.I. 2 at 6) Plaintiff alleges
that any uncharged offense disclosed involving a minor is
reported to Child Protective Services or law enforcement. In
addition, other information such as personal or medical
information is provided, without consent, to probation, the
parole board, and the court.
alleges that when an inmate does not provide information
sought by Defendant Hyde ("Hyde"), Director of
Transitions, the inmate is punished or kicked out of the
program. When this happens, the inmate will do more time,
lose all good time, receive a class one write-up, go through
a lengthy "unwinnable" disciplinary process, and be
sanctioned through a change in housing assignment. Once the
inmate has completed the sanction, he is forced back into the
program and the process begins anew.
also alleges that Matthew Dutton ("Dutton")
returned all her complaints and grievances with no further
action, VCC Warden Dana Metzger ("Metzger") did not
investigate and failed to act, as sex offender counselor
Klein ("Klein") acknowledged, but refused to
address the issues, and that all Defendants approved of the
program and were aware of Plaintiffs complaints.
seeks injunctive relief in the form of "removal of the
program from the state prison due to the environment; on
street program in place mandatory upon release."
(Id. at 8)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief." Bail v.
Famiglio 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Or. 2013); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma
pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in
which prisoner seeks redress from governmental defendant); 42
U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to
prison conditions). The Court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light
most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d
Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her
pleading is liberally construed and her Complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)® and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may
dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual
scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also
Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989);
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison
officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §
1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when
deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v.
McCullough,184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§1915 and 1915A, the Court