L. Scott, Judge
filed a Complaint in this action on August 8, 2017.
Plaintiffs allege that over the past three years Defendants
created a hazard to Plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants removed a "significant number of
standing trees contained within the City of Newark's
natural buffer zone" and "bush hogging of
approximately 5, 000 square feet of property controlled by
the City of Newark." Plaintiffs contend that this
provided them privacy and a natural drainage area which
protected their property from flooding. They allege that the
"relocation of felled trees or cut trees result[ed] in
the hindrance of natural drainage of Plaintiffs
property." Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that the
"placement of a non-permitted underground propane tank,
in the minimum size of 400 gallons, on Defendants'
property, adjacent to Plaintiffs property, and the
installation of certain heating systems without permit"
created a dangerous condition of property. Plaintiffs also
pled that starting in April of 2017, Defendants caused damage
to Plaintiffs' property by removing a drain pipe and
filling the reaming pipe with rocks and debris, intentionally
altering the natural grade of Defendants' property which
prevented the natural flow of water, trimmed trees along the
property line, and cleared the Buffer Zone of naturally
of Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Defendants' use
and maintenance of the property is a continuing nuisance, and
Plaintiffs seek an injunction as well as an award of money
damages. Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks general,
specific, and punitive damages from Defendants. Count III
claims that Plaintiffs possessed a prescriptive easement and
Defendants' have continued to obstruct the easement and
there are no adequate remedies at law for Plaintiffs injures.
Finally, Count IV of Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that
Defendants defamed Plaintiffs, and the slanderous comments
caused injury to Plaintiffs' reputation.
of an answer, Defendant William Collison filed a Motion to
Dismiss this action on August 31, 2017. Defendant William
Collision argues that Plaintiffs primarily seek an injunction
and a prescriptive easement and there is no remedy at law for
the alleged injuries. Thus, this Court does not have
jurisdiction over those claims. Plaintiffs filed a Response
on October 19, 2017. Plaintiffs argue that although
Plaintiffs have claimed "some equitable relief, the
primary gravamen of their Complaint is for damages."
test for sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether a plaintiff may recover
under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances
susceptible of proof under the complaint. In making its
determination, the Court must accept all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
factual inferences in favor of the non-moving
party.The complaint must be without merit as a
matter of fact or law to be dismissed.Therefore, if the
plaintiff can recover under any conceivable set of
circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint, the
motion to dismiss will not be granted.
Delaware law is clear that "fictitious name practice is
not permitted. This is because there is no statute or rule
specifically authorizing fictitious name practice. Filing a
claim against 'John Doe' has no legal effect in this
State." Not only does fictitious name practice
have no legal effect, its "impossible to obtain services
of process on a non-existent person." Plaintiffs'
claims against "Does 1 through 20" are therefore
dismissed. Next, Plaintiffs' equitable claims are hereby
dismissed. In this State it's "well-established that
the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction where
(among other things) a party: 1) seeks an equitable remedy,
such as specific performance or an injunction, and 2) lacks
an adequate remedy at law. Indeed the 'Court of Chancery
has exclusive jurisdiction where injunctive relief
is sought'." Thus this Court does not have jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs' equitable claims and they are dismissed.
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART
IS SO ORDERED.
 Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967,
968 (1978); see Cambium Ltd. v. Trilantic Capital
Partners IIIL.P., 2012 WL 172844, at *1 (Del. Jan. 20,
2012)(citing Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg.
Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011)).
Ramunnov. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029,
1034-36 (Del. 1998); Nix v. Sawyer, 466 A.2d 407,
410 (Del. Super. Ct.1983).
 Diamond State Tel. Co. v.
University of Delaware, 269 A.2d 52 (Del. 1970).
Ramunno, 705 A.2d at 1034;
see Cambium, 2012 WL 172844, at *1 (citing Cent.
Mortg, 27 ...