United States District Court, D. Delaware
Kokinda, Waterbury, Vermont. Pro Se Plaintiff.
ANDREWS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Jason Kokinda proceeds pro se and has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He commenced
this action on October 30, 2017, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(D.I. 2). The Court proceeds to review and screen
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
November 12, 2009, Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty but
mentally ill to four counts of unlawful contact with a minor,
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6318, and one count of criminal use
of a communication facility, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7512.
See Kokinda v. Coleman, 2017 WL 2296900 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 27, 2017) (citing Commonwealth v. Kokinda, No.
CP-39-CR-0004541-2007 (Phila. Cnty. Com. PI.), Criminal
Docket at 4, 13-14). On February 17, 2010, he was sentenced
to a term of thirty-six to eighty-four months of
alleges he has documented a history of civil right abuses by
Pennsylvania officials and became a political trophy for
former Pennsylvania governor Tom Corbett and the Koch
Brothers. (D.I. 2 at ¶ 3). He infers that Kathleen Kane
coordinated with William Stoycos under pressure from current
Pennsylvania governor Tom Wolf and Corbett to attempt to
fabricate a case to hold Plaintiff in prison in perpetuity.
(Id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that upon his
release from prison on November 1, 2015, two deputies from
the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General threatened to
maliciously prosecute him under a theory of subliminal
threats against Stoycos. (Id. at ¶ 5).
Plaintiff was released as a tier 3 sex offender, must wear a
GPS ankle bracelet, is under community supervision for life,
and is labeled a sex offender. (Id. at ¶¶
2, 8, 10).
his release from prison, Plaintiff and his mother were
looking for a hotel room near Dover, Delaware, the night of
November 2, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 1). Around 11 p.m.
Plaintiff and his mother were involved in a road rage
incident when John Doe #3 attempted to run their vehicle off
the road, followed by a high speed chase. (Id. at
¶ 16). Plaintiff states this occurred because he was
just released from a prison in a state having strong ties to
Wolf, and Wolf had influence over former Delaware governor
Jack Markell to retaliate against Plaintiff. (Id. at
¶ 12). Plaintiff infers that Marked has personal
involvement and alleges all of this creates a reasonable
inference of a corrupt government-sponsored retaliation.
(Id. at ¶¶ 13, 20). Plaintiff reported the
incident to the Harrington police, who did nothing.
(Id. at ¶ 24).
alleges that police throughout Delaware appeared out of
nowhere whenever he used his cellphone, were invading his
privacy, and tracing the phone's GPS. (Id. at
¶ 31) Plaintiff seems to allege that the tracking is a
result of the sex offender registry and that Supervisor John
Doe #1 is involved. (Id. at ¶ 33). When
Plaintiff wanted to add "without prejudice" at the
time of registry, he was threatened with prison for failure
to register. (Id. at ¶ 34). Plaintiff alleges
that John Doe #2, who is located in Dover, fabricated the
rule as a means to intimidate Plaintiff from asserting his
legal rights. (Id.)
alleges the incidents of corruption are not the personal
agenda of Wolf but are rooted in the mafia, the Koch
Brothers, and Koch Industries as the bankroll. (Id.
at ¶ 35). Plaintiff alleges he is being targeted for his
lawsuits against the fracking industry. (Id. at
¶ 37). He explains that Koch Industries is the second
largest private corporation in America and, since Corbett
passed millions of dollars in tax breaks and tax regulations
in Pennsylvania, this guarantees Plaintiff will be retaliated
against when he seeks to expose corruption. (Id. at
alleges that all Defendants acted under color of law in this
"Masonic RICO conspiracy" to violate his
constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶ 42). He seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013). The Court must accept all
factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in
the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229
(3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94.
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28; Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a
complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of
28 U.S.C. §1915, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to