Stoner, Esquire, Ronald Stoner, P.A.
P. Connell, Esquire Deputy Attorney General State of Delaware
Department of Justice.
R. Montgomery-Reeves Vice Chancellor.
letter opinion addresses Defendant's Motion for
Reargument of this Court's October 2, 2017 Letter Opinion
denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (the "Letter
Opinion"). For the reasons stated herein,
Defendant's Motion for Reargument is DENIED.
Letter Opinion denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Petition to Enforce an Arbitration Award. The
Motion to Dismiss sought "a declaration from this Court
that the term 'make whole' as used in the Arbitration
Award requires an offset of interim earnings be applied to
the amount of back-pay awarded to
Grievant." I denied the Motion to Dismiss because
Defendant could not meet the requirements under the Federal
Arbitration Act (the "FAA") to allow the Court to
interpret, modify, or remand the Arbitration
Letter Opinion, I applied the standard from the FAA.
Defendant did not articulate a standard in its opening brief;
Plaintiff argued the FAA applies to this case in its
opposition brief; and Defendant did not dispute that the FAA
applies in its reply brief or at oral argument. Furthermore,
Defendant did not once reference the collective bargaining
agreement (the "CBA") or cite to a single Delaware
case applying the standard it now claims applies.
October 9, 2017, however, Defendant brought this Motion
arguing that the FAA does not apply in this case. Ultimately,
Defendant is correct. Nonetheless, I deny the Motion for
Reargument because even under the correct standard the
outcome remains the same.
Court of Chancery Rule 59(f), a party may move for reargument
within five days after the filing of the Court's
opinion. Reargument will be granted only where the
court "overlooked a decision or principle of law that
would have controlling effect or . . . misapprehended the
facts or the law so the outcome of the decision would be
argues this Court overlooked a principle of law that would
have a controlling effect on the case. That is, Defendant
contends that because this dispute involves a collective
bargaining agreement, neither the FAA nor the Delaware
Uniform Arbitration Act (the "DUAA") applies to
this case under Section 5725 of the DUAA, which reads:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this chapter by word or
inference to the contrary, this chapter shall not apply to
labor contracts with either public or private employers where
such contracts have been negotiated by, or the employees
covered thereby are represented by, any ...