Submitted: August 14, 2017
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief DENIED.
Rebecca E. Anderson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General,
Delaware Department of Justice, Attorney for the State of
C. Gill, Esquire, Attorney for Defendant.
INTRODUCTION & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
the Court is a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61") filed
by Mark Taylor ("Defendant"). Defendant alleges
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
December 7, 2015, Defendant was arrested for multiple charges
of possession of a controlled substance; multiple charges of
manufacture, deliver, or possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance; one assault charge; one charge for
resisting arrest; one charge of tempering with physical
evidence; and one charge of possession of drug paraphernalia.
Counsel was appointed and on December 31, 2015 filed requests
for discovery. On January 5, 2016, before discovery was
provided, Defendant pled guilty to Drug Dealing in Tier 4
quantity, and Assault in the Second Degree. Defendant did not
file for an appeal. On September 8, 2016, Defendant, through
retained counsel, filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief.
This Court requested Defendant's trial counsel file a
Rule 61(g) Affidavit to address Defendant's claims, and
received the Affidavit on May 2, 2017. The State
notified the Court on May 16, 2017 that it did not intend to
file a Response to Defendant's Motion. On August 11,
2017, the Court received Defendant's reply to trial
counsel's Affidavit. This is the Court's decision.
asserts trial counsel was ineffective in several ways.
Defendant contends trial counsel "did not provide any
effective assistance of counsel
whatsoever." Defendant contends had trial counsel been
effective, he would not have taken the plea and would have
pursued several legal issues. The first issue Defendant
raises is that "[t]he seizure in this case was clearly
unreasonable under both the Delaware and United States
claims trial counsel was ineffective for not reviewing any
recordings of the in- car cameras or body cameras. Defendant
claims the lack of review of the cameras' contents was
prejudicial to him.
contends trial counsel did not raise issues with regards to
three search warrants, and that proper suppression motions
should have been filed because the warrants lacked probable
cause and were "illegally done in violation of the
Delaware and United States Constitution."
lastly claims trial counsel failed to inform him of the
issues involving the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
("OCME")/Division of Forensic Science
("DFS"). Defendant contends if he "had known
about the problems occurring in OCME/DFS he would not have
agreed to take the plea and thus was prejudiced.
counsel avers that Defendant wanted to enter a plea the day
trial counsel first met the Defendant for his preliminary
hearing on December 17, 2015. Trial counsel avers he advised
the Defendant that it would be in Defendant's best
interest to allow him more time to acquire and review
discovery material before making any decision about a
plea. Trial counsel contends he "strongly
advised the Defendant against taking a plea until I had an
opportunity to conduct a proper and thorough review of all
discovery material." Trial counsel avers that Defendant
insisted upon entering a plea before affording him an
opportunity to acquire any video and/or audio recordings,
and/or, copies of any warrants. Lastly, trial counsel
contends he was not aware of any ongoing problems affecting
the OCME/DFS at the time, and that he "would have been
ineffective in counseling Movant if I would have inferred
that any past problems experienced by the then OCME still
existed under DFS."