United States District Court, D. Delaware
plaintiff, Sekhem Hamud Re Anu El ("the plaintiff),
appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed
in forma pauperis. (D.I. 6.) He commenced this
action on August 28, 2017. (D.I. 2.) The court proceeds to
review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
plaintiff is also known as Aalim A. Spencer. He was issued
three citations, T4044662-6, T4044664-1, and T404463-0. (D.I.
2 at 1.) The court take judicial notice from the Magisterial
District Courts Docket Sheets of Delaware County,
Pennsylvania, that the plaintiff was arrested by the
defendant Trooper Zachary R. Dombroski
("Dombroski") on June 14, 2017 in the Upper
Chichester Township in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. The
plaintiff received citations for driving while operating
privilege is suspended or revoked (citation T4044662-6),
registration card to be signed and exhibited on demand
(citation T4044664-1), and the unauthorized transfer or use
of registration (citation T404463-0). It appears that the
plaintiffs 2000 Ford Taurus was towed the same day by the
defendant Twin Oaks Towing and Auto Services ("Twin Oaks
Towing"). (D.I. 2 at 14). On June 30, 2017, the
plaintiff was notified by Twin Oaks Towing that if he
knowingly abandoned his vehicle for whatever reasons it would
seek full reimbursement for all lost fees. (Id.) The
plaintiff was given 48 hours to respond to Twin Oaks
Towing's letter before the vehicle was processed for
traffic citations were filed in the Magisterial District
Court on June 14, 2017, and transferred as cases on July 11,
2017. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Spencer,
Docket Nos. MJ-32136-TR-0001680-2017;
MJ-32128-TR-0001780-2017; MJ-32128-TR-0001781-2017; and
MJ-32128-TR-0001782-2017. The court takes judicial notice
that the plaintiff pled guilty to all three citations on
October 25, 2017, and was imposed a fine of $494.82. See
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Spencer, Docket Nos.
MJ-32128-TR-0001780-2017; MJ-32128-TR-0001781-2017; and
plaintiff alleges that he has a constitutional right to
travel and appears to allege that the imposition of the
citations infringed upon that right. He also alleges that the
defendants violated several federal criminal statutes
including 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 245. (D.I. 2
at 5, 12). It appears that the plaintiff seeks the return of
his vehicle and the criminal prosecution of the defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The
court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se
plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because the plaintiff proceeds pro
se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, "however inartfiilly pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill,
878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint
or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009); Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that
a claim has substantive plausibility.
See Johnson v. City of Shelby, __
U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not
dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal
theory supporting the claim asserted. See Id. at
the pleading regime established by Twombly and
Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2)
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and
(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the
complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a
"context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."
extent the plaintiff seeks to impose criminal liability upon
the defendants pursuant to the criminal statutes upon which
he relies, he lacks standing to proceed. See Allen v.
Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, 270
Fed.Appx. 149, 150 (3d Cir, 2008) (unpublished); see
United States v. Friedland,83 F.3d 1531, 1539 (3d Cir.
1996) ("[T]he United States Attorney is responsible for
the prosecution of all criminal cases within his or her
district."). The decision of whether to prosecute, and