United States District Court, D. Delaware
IN RE SAMSON RESOURCES CORPORATION, et al, Reorganized Debtors.
SAMSON RESOURCES CORPORATION, et al, Appellees. CALVIN WILLIAMS, Appellant,
before this Court is pro se appellant Calvin
Williams' Motion for Reconsideration. (D.I. 62). He seeks
reconsideration of the Court's August 30, 2017 order
(D.I. 61), which dismissed his appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is
background of this dispute is set forth in the Court's
previous Memorandum. (D.I. 60). Familiarity with that
Memorandum is assumed.
notice of appeal was filed December 5, 2016. (Id. at
4). In essence, the Court's previous Memorandum held that
the notice of appeal needed to be filed within fourteen days
from when the time to file a notice of appeal started to run,
and that (1) the triggering date was September 7, 2016, when
the Bankruptcy Court denied appellant's first motion to
reconsider (id. at 7), or, in the alternative, (2)
the triggering date was November 16, 2016, when the
Bankruptcy Court denied appellant's second motion to
reconsider. (Id. at 8). In the second alternative,
the notice of appeal would have had to be filed by Wednesday,
November 30, 2016, to be timely. (Id.).
September 5, 2017, Mr. Williams filed the motion for
reconsideration, asserting that he "was not properly
informed by the Court on Appeal deadline, or where to file my
appeal, this is verifiable from transcripts of 11/16/16
hearing, " and that Bankruptcy Rule 9006 extended the
deadline to file the notice of appeal by three days, meaning
that a notice of appeal filed on December 5, 2016, was
timely. (D.I. 62 at 1-2). Mr. Williams also requests that the
Court grant an extension of time to file his notice of appeal
based on excusable neglect. (Id. at 2-4).
October 5, 2017, Mr. Williams filed a notice of appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (D.I.
69). The Third Circuit appeal is currently stayed pending the
Court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration.
(See D.I. 74).
Standard of Review.
purpose of a motion for reconsideration "is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence." Kabacinski v. Bostrom Seating, Inc.,
98 Fed.Appx. 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Harsco Corp.
v. Zlotnick, 779 F.2d 906, 999 (3d Cir. 1985). A motion
to reconsider an order may be granted if the party seeking
reconsideration establishes at least one of the following
grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law;
(2) the availability of new evidence that was not available
when the court issued the ruling; or (3) the need to correct
a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice. See Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann,
Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). The
standard that a movant "must meet to prevail on a motion
for reconsideration is high." Zokaites Properties LP
v. La Mesa Racing, LLC, 2011 WL 2293283, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
June 9, 2011) (citing Berry v. Jacobs IMC, LLC, 99
Fed.Appx. 405, 410 (3d Cir. 2004).
"A party's mere disagreement with the Court does not
translate into the type of clear error of law which justifies
reconsideration of a ruling." Zokaites, 2011 WL
2293283, at *l;see also Dare Invs., LLC v. Chi. Title
Ins. Co., 2011 WL 5513196, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2011)
(mere disagreement with the Court's decision will not
suffice). Moreover, reargument and reconsideration requests
"are not a substitute for an appeal from a final
judgment" nor are they an opportunity for "endless
debate between the parties and the Court." Brambles
USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Del.
1990) (internal citations omitted). Reargument should not be
granted where it would merely "allow wasteful repetition
of arguments already briefed, considered, and decided."
Id. (citing Weissman v. Fruchtman, 124
F.R.D. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
motion to reconsider does not set forth any intervening
change in controlling law or allege that new evidence has
become available. Thus, the Court has no basis to grant
relief on those grounds. Mr. Williams appears to argue that
reconsideration is required to correct a clear error of law
or to prevent manifest injustice. (See D.I. 62). Mr.
Williams assumes that the triggering date is November 16,
2016, and argues that the Court should reconsider because
Bankruptcy Rule 9006 extended by three days his deadline to
file the notice of appeal. (See Id. at 1). Mr.
Williams did not raise the Bankruptcy Rule 9006 argument in
his briefing on the motion to dismiss, and it was therefore
not discussed in the Memorandum. Raising it now is therefore
outside of the scope of a motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, considering Mr. Williams' pro se
status, and the 16, 000 hours that he has "invested in
this case" (D.I. 75 at 3), the Court will address the
Rule 9006 argument. Mr. Williams' argument must fail, for
the following reasons.
First, as this Court has already determined, the deadline for
Mr. Williams to file the notice of appeal began to run from
the date of the Bankruptcy Court's order denying his
first motion for reconsideration, which was entered on
September 7, 2016. (See D.I. 60 at 7). As Mr.
Williams makes no argument as to why the Court erred in this
determination, there is no ground to reconsider it. On this
basis, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Second, even if the deadline to file the notice of appeal ran
from the denial of the second motion to reconsider, that is,
November 16, 2016, the notice of appeal filed on December 5,
2016 was still untimely. (D.I. 60 at 8). Bankruptcy Rule
9006(f) does not apply to the appeals period prescribed by
Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a). By its plain language, Bankruptcy
Rule 9006(f) applies "[w]hen there is a right or
requirement to act. .. within a prescribed period after being
served and that service is by mail..." See Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9006(f). Bankruptcy Rule 9006(f) does not extend
the time within which to act where, as here, the time period
for taking the action begins to run from an event other than
service, such as the entry of the underlying order.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(f); In
reArbuckle, 988 F.2d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(f), by its terms, "applies
when a time period begins to run after service, " and
thus does not apply to the appeals period prescribed by
Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a), which begins to run upon entry of
the order, not its service). The Court followed well-settled
law regarding the timeliness of appeals under Bankruptcy Rule
8002, and Mr. Williams has cited no authority to the
contrary. Thus, there is no clear error of law or manifest
injustice that must be corrected on reconsideration.
Williams claims the result is harsh. I do not disagree, but
Congress has mandated the jurisdictional nature of appellate
deadlines, and the Third Circuit has, as it must, followed
suit. See In re Caterbone,640 F.3d 108, 113 (3d