United States District Court, D. Delaware
STEFANIE D. MASON, Plaintiff,
STATE OF DELAWARE (J.P. COURT), et al., Defendants.
Stefanie D. Mason, Newark, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Clement Handlon, Deputy Attorney General Deputy, Delaware
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Stefanie D. Mason ("Plaintiff) filed this action
alleging employment discrimination by reason of a disability.
(D.I. 2) She proceeds pro se. The Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Presently
before the Court are Plaintiffs motion to reopen the case,
Defendants' motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs request for
counsel. (D.I. 10, 23, 28)
complaint and amended complaint allege employment
discrimination by reason of disability and retaliation in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
1994, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the criminal code as
set forth in Title 18 of the United States Code.
(See D.I. 2, 11) Plaintiff alleges that the
discriminatory acts occurred on January 1, 2012 and July 21,
2013. (See id.) Plaintiff states that on December
14, 2014, she filed charges with the Department of Labor of
the State of Delaware Office of Anti-Discrimination and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of the United States
("EEOC"). (See id.) The original complaint
states that the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue in
December 2015. (See D.I. 2) Plaintiff commenced this
action on December 22, 2015. Plaintiff filed two right to sue
letters on August 15, 2017, for EEC Charge Nos. 530201503643
and 17C201400762. (D.I. 27)
seeks compensatory damages, the disbarment of two attorneys,
and the termination of defendants' employment. In the
complaint, plaintiff also requests counsel. (See
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Utig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court may grant such a
motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and
viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna,
Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that
a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City
of Shelby, U.S., 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint
may not dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the
legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See Id.
survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege
facts that 'raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).'" Victaulic
Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is facially
plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At bottom, "[t]he
complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each]
necessary element" of a plaintiffs claim. Wilkerson
v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321
(3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Court is not obligated to accept as true "bald
assertions, " Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist,
132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted), "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted
inferences, " Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Power & Ught Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d
Cir. 1997), or allegations that are "self-evidently
false." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 69 (3d Cir.
1996). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her
pleading is liberally construed and her Complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and 12(b)(6) on
the grounds that the Complaint fails to state claims upon
which relief may be granted (particularly the individual
defendants), and Plaintiff ...