Defendant Veronica Hicks' Motion for Post Conviction
HONORABLE CALVIN L. SCOTT, JR. Judge
March 11, 2013, Defendant was arrested and charged with
Identity Theft, Forgery Second Degree, and Unlawful Use of a
Credit Card > $1, 500. On September 9, 2013, Defendant
plead guilty, with the assistance of counsel. Defendant filed
this Motion for Post-Conviction Relief on June 17, 2014 based
on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court appointed
Sean Motoyoshi, Esquire to represent Defendant. Mr. Motoyoshi
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on August 5, 2016,
stating that Defendant's claims were meritless. Patrick
Collins, Esquire was subsequently appointed to represent
Defendant, and Mr. Collins adopted Mr. Motoyoshi's motion
and stated that Defendant was given notice and an opportunity
to respond, but she chose not to.
Court must address Defendant's motion in regard to Rule
61(i) procedural requirements before assessing the merits of
his motion. Rule 61(i)(1) bars motions for
postconviction relief if the motion is filed more than one
year from final judgment. Defendant's Motion is not time
barred by Rule 61(i)(1). Rule 61(i)(2)bars successive
postconviction motions, which is also not applicable as this
is Defendant's first postconviction motion. Rule 61(i)(3)
bars relief if the motion includes claims not asserted in the
proceedings leading to the final judgment. This bar is also
not applicable as Defendant claims ineffective assistance of
counsel, which could not have been raised in any direct
appeal. Finally, Rule 61(i)(4) bars relief if the
motion is based on a formally adjudicated
ground. This bar is also not applicable to
adopted the two-prong test proffered in Strickland v.
Washington to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that
"counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been
different." The Court's "review of
counsel's representation is subject to a strong
presumption that representation was professionally
reasonable." The "benchmark for judging any claim
of ineffectiveness [is to] be whether counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced
a just result."
claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel for various
reasons, including: trial counsel did not ask for a trial
continuance, there was only one face to face consultation,
counsel refused to accept phone calls from prison, he failed
to investigate the victim allegedly visiting Defendant in
prison, and Defense counsel ignored her letters stating she
wanted to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing. After
reviewing Defendant's Motion for Postconviction relief,
and Counsel's Motion to Withdraw, the Court finds that
Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel is meritless.
Defendant's claims do not demonstrate that trial counsel
acted outside the Strickland standard of
reasonableness, nor would have the result been different but
for these alleged errors. Additionally, Defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty to the charges on
September 9, 2013. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for
Postconviction Relief is denied. Counsel's Motion to
Withdraw is Moot.
IS SO ORDERED.
 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (i)(1).
 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
See State v. Berry, 2016 WL
5624893, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2016); see also
Watson v. State, 2013 WL 5745708, at *2 (Del. ...