United States District Court, D. Delaware
Stamatios Stamoulis and Richard C. Weinblatt, STAMOULIS &
WEINBLATT LLC, Wilmington, DE Steven Callahan, Martin Robson,
Anthony M. Garza, and C. Luke Nelson, CHARHON CALLAHAN ROBSON
& GARZA, Dallas, TX Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Benjamin J. Schladweiler, ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP,
Wilmington, DE Bryant C. Boren, Jr., Jon V. Swenson,
Elizabeth Boggs, Jason German, and Jay B. Schiller, BAKER
BOTTS LLP, Palo Alto, CA Attorneys for Defendants AT&T
Corp., AT&T Services, Inc., and SBC Internet Services,
Richard L. Renck, DUANE MORRIS LLP, Wilmington, DE Matthew C.
Gaudet, Alison H. Hutton, and Jennifer H. Forte, DUANE MORRIS
LLP, Atlanta, GA Attorneys for Defendants CenturyTel
Broadband Services, LLC and Qwest Corporation.
Phillip A. Rovner and Jonathan A. Choa, POTTER ANDERSON &
CORROON, LLP, Wilmington, DE Timothy R. Shannon, Taylor R.
Neff, and Seth S. Coburn, VERRILL DANA, LLP, Portland, ME
Attorneys for Defendant Frontier Communications Corporation.
U.S. District Judge
April 15, 2011, Plaintiff United Access Technologies LLC
("United Access") filed suit against Defendants
AT&T Corp., AT&T Services, Inc., and SBC Internet
Services, LLC; CenturyTel Broadband Services, LLC and Qwest
Corporation; and Frontier Communications Corporation
(collectively, "Defendants"), alleging infringement
of U.S. Patent Nos. 5, 844, 596, 6, 243, 446, and 6, 542,
585, which describe and claim systems for
transmitting data to residences or businesses over existing
telephone wiring without interfering with telephone signals
or the switching equipment that is part of the public
switched telephone network.
Court issued a claim construction opinion on November 4,
2016. (See C.A. No. 11-339-LPS D.I. 178) In light of
that claim construction, the parties jointly requested that
Defendants be allowed to file an early motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement. (See D.I. 184)
Presently before the Court is that motion for summary
judgment of non-infringement. The Court heard oral argument
on February 27, 2017. (See D.I. 200
reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendants'
motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot
be - or, alternatively, is - genuinely disputed must be
supported either by "citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes
of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials, " or by "showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1)(A) & (B). If the moving party has carried its
burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court will "draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it
may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must "do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; see also Podobnik
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005)
(stating party opposing summary judgment "must present
more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue")
(internal quotation marks omitted). The "mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment;" a factual dispute is genuine only where
"the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
"If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations
omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is
mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial"). Thus, the "mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the
nonmoving party's position is insufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment; there must be "evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find" for the nonmoving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the
remote-terminal embodiments of the accused systems do not
literally meet the "signal interface" limitation
and (2) predicating infringement of that limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents would result in claim