United States District Court, D. Delaware
TRINA R. GUMBS, Plaintiff,
STATE OF DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Defendant.
Magistrate Judge has filed a Report and Recommendation. (D.I.
51). It recommends granting summary judgment to Defendant.
Plaintiff has filed objections, to which the Defendant has
responded. (D.I. 52, D.I. 54). The matter is now before this
Court. For the reasons that follow, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Court OVERRULES
Plaintiffs Objections (D.I. 52) and ADOPTS
the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (D.I.
1996 to 2015, Trina Gumbs, Plaintiff, was employed at the
Office of Anti-Discrimination ("OAD"). (D.I. 15
¶ 6). Plaintiff was promoted throughout her tenure and
eventually became a Labor Law Enforcement Supervisor.
(Id. ¶ 7). Due to a vacancy, Plaintiff was
appointed as interim acting OAD Regulatory Specialist, which
included a temporary pay increase for the position.
(Id. ¶ 10). The OAD created a job posting for
the Regulatory Specialist position and listed two preferred
qualifications: "(1) experience in resolving employment
and/or discrimination complaints; and (2) possession of a
Juris Doctorate." (D.I. 45 at 7). Five candidates,
including Plaintiff and Daniel McGannon, were interviewed for
the position. (Id.). McGannon, a lawyer with a J.D.
and previous experience with employment discrimination, was
hired as the new Regulatory Specialist. (Id.).
McGannon's hiring, Plaintiff returned to her position and
pay as a Labor Law Enforcement Supervisor, subordinate to
McGannon. (D.I. 15 ¶ 20). "Because of
McGannon's unfamiliarity with the OAD's operations,
[Plaintiff] began training him and performing some of his
duties." (D.I. 51 at 3). McGannon worked from the
OAD's Wilmington, Delaware office, while Plaintiff worked
from the OAD's satellite office in Milford, Delaware.
(D.I. 45 at 4).
filed a one-count complaint against Defendant for violation
of the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). This complaint has
been amended. (D.I. 15).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
magistrate judge may make a report and recommendation
regarding a case-dispositive motion. BeazerE., Inc. v.
Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 444 (3d Cir. 2005). "When
reviewing the decision of a Magistrate Judge on a dispositive
matter, the Court conducts a de novo review."
28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); FED. R. Crv. P. 72(b)(3);
Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 62
F.Supp.3d 368, 379 (D. Del. 2014). A summary judgment motion
is considered a dispositive motion. D. Del. LR 72.1 (3).
"The district judge must determine de novo any part of
the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly
objected to." Fed. R. Crv. P. 72(b)(3). The Court may
"accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition..." of the magistrate judge. Id.
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, the court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Wishkin v.
Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). A dispute is
"genuine" only if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,
FAILURE TO PROMOTE
argues Plaintiffs claim is a failure to promote claim. (D.I.
45 at 21-23; D.I. 49 at 8-11). As did the Magistrate Judge, I
disagree. Plaintiffs complaint clearly states her claim as an
EPA violation. (D.I. 15 at 4). I will not analyze the claim
as a failure to promote claim since Plaintiff has not alleged