United States District Court, D. Delaware
Jordean Lorah, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Jordean Lorah ("Plaintiff') filed this action on
November 2, 2016. (D.I. 2) She appears pro se and
has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(D.I. 4) Plaintiff moves to: (1) consider the HIPPA Act (D.I.
5); (2) include specific medical documentation as an
admission (D.I. 6); and (3) amend the Complaint (D.I. 6). The
Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
not clear, Plaintiff appears to complain that her medical
records contain incorrect or inaccurate information, errors,
false statements, false entries, and refer to medical issues
that she has not been diagnosed with or for which she has
been tested. She alleges that her medical history was
collected on July 7, 2016, via the telephone, in preparation
for surgery scheduled for the next day. She also alleges
that, as of October 12, 2016, there was documentation of
newly-discovered evidence regarding false medical documents.
Plaintiff alleges that on February 22 and 23, May 6 and 11,
June 22, July 5, August 5, 24, and 31, 2016, she was either:
(1) at Defendant's medical facility for testing; (2) at a
physician's appointment; (3) speaking with a privacy
officer in the legal risk department; or (4) picking up
copies of her lab work. Plaintiff alleges that the
dissemination of false information was communicated by
Defendant's employees. It appears that Plaintiff reviewed
her medical records, discovered the errors, and some
corrections were made, but a few medical entries remain
"undiagnosed." (See D.I. 2)
frames her allegations as: (1) a First Amendment violation of
her right to privacy "as it misrepresents the facts of
[her] present or past circumstances;" (2) a Fourteenth
Amendment violation "suspect identify, regarding no
legitimate purpose which deprived [her] of her citizenship
and national origin pertaining to life, liberty, [and]
property as it falsely misrepresents [her] identity;"
(3) a HIPPA violation, as her "privacy has been invaded
as she has been strictly scrutinized and isolated as if she
was a health risk;" (4) Defendant's failure to
comply with 18 U.S.C. § 1035(2) "false statements
or false writing"; (5) a violation of 42 C.F.R.
482.24(c) "standard condition of participation medical
information must support diagnosis;" and (6) a violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324c for document fraud in preparing
"a document that is false resulting in false
misrepresentation and false statements."
seeks mediation to resolve the dispute, as well as penalties
under 8 U.S.C. § 1324c for document fraud, ranging from
$250 to $2, 000 per page.
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) if "the action is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief." Ball p. Famiglio, 726
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro
se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because
Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally
construed and her Complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or
"fantastic or delusional" factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch
v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Or. 1995)
(holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took
an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint
or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, the Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend
her complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). While "detailed
factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must
do more than simply provide "labels and
conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action." Davis v. Abington
Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306,
315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twmbly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that
a claim has substantive plausibility. See
Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct.
346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed for imperfect
statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.
See Id. at 346.
the pleading regime established by Twombly and
Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2)
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and
(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp.,809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts
in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679