PAULA G. ALCOCK, Appellant Below, Appellant,
DPNL LLC and UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, Appellees Below, Appellees.
Submitted: April 13, 2017
Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware C.A. No.
STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and SEITZ, Justices.
COLLINS J. SEITZ, JR. JUSTICE
11th day of July 2017, upon consideration of the parties'
submissions on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
May 31, 2016 decision, the Superior Court correctly found
that the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board properly denied
Ms. Alcock's request for unemployment benefits based on
her June 17, 2015 testimony before the Board that she was
medically unable to work. Under Delaware law, medical disability
renders an employee ineligible for unemployment benefits
during the time of medical disability.
Superior Court also correctly decided not to remand the case
for further proceedings. When Ms. Alcock appealed the
Board's decision to the Superior Court as a
self-represented party, she included with her opening brief a
letter from a physician claiming she was medically cleared to
return to work as of June 22, 2015. An employee becomes eligible
for unemployment benefits when her medical disability
ends. Because Ms. Alcock had not submitted the
physician's letter to the Board in the first instance,
Board's attorney wrote to the Superior Court and
requested that the court remand the case to the Board to
consider the letter. The Superior Court asked for an
explanation of what would happen if the case was remanded to
the Board. The Board responded that if, as her
physician concluded, Ms. Alcock's medical disability had
ended, "were this case remanded and absent any
significant testimony or evidence to the contrary, the Board
would reverse its earlier decision and find that Ms. Alcock
was medically able to work effective June 22,
2015." In other words, if nothing changed
following remand, Ms. Alcock would be eligible to receive
unemployment benefits. The Superior Court nonetheless denied
the Board's request for a remand, ruling that
"[b]ecause the Board's decision was manifestly
correct and because the new 'evidence' submitted with
this appeal related to events occurring after the Board made
its decision, the request to remand the matter is
of seeking a remand, the Board should have done what appears
to be the standard practice-request affirmance without
prejudice to Ms. Alcock's ability to submit her
physician's recent letter with her change in status to
the Board for its consideration. Even without the
Board's explicit request, the Superior Court probably
contemplated this very result would occur-following
affirmance of the appeal, Ms. Alcock would submit the
physician's letter to the Board for consideration. Ms.
Alcock also could have avoided the dispute entirely if she
had followed the Board's advice while this appeal was
pending-"report to the Division of Unemployment
Insurance and reopen her claim with her doctor's
certificate." She did not follow through. It might be
that Ms. Alcock's claim is now untimely,  but that is
no reason to quarrel with the result reached by the Superior
Court. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
 Alcock v. DPNL LLC, 2016 WL
3208059 (Del. Super. May 31, 2016).
 19 Del. C. § 3314(8)
 Docket at 10, Alcock v. DPNL
LLC, Del. Super., C.A. No. N15A-07-007 (Oct. 7, 2015)