DENNIS D. & DIANE M. BLEVINS, Plaintiffs,
HOPE L. METZGAR AND ROBERT O. METZGAR, JR., Defendants.
L. Gouge, Jr., Esq.
Richard L. Abbot, Esq.
ORDER (I) DENYING DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIM
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REARGUMENT - DA UBERT MOTION AND
(II) DENYING DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR REARGUMENT - SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
M. Davis, Judge.
consideration of Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reargument - Daubert Motion (the
"Daubert Reargument Motion") filed by
Defendants Hope and Robert Metzgar on June 13th,
2017; Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reargument - Summary Judgment (the "Summary Judgment
Reargument Motion") filed by Defendants Hope and Robert
Metzgar on June 13th, 2017; Plaintiffs Dennis and
Diane Blevins not having responded to the Daubert
Reargument Motion or the Summary Judgment Reargument Motion;
the Court's June 6, 2017 Order Denying Defendants'
Daubert Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs' Proposed
Expert Evidences (the "Daubert Order");
the Court's June 8, 2017 Memorandum Opinion Denying
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (the
"Summary Judgment Opinion"); Superior Court Civil
Rule 59(e); the entire record of this civil proceeding; and
having determined that no hearing is necessary on the
Daubert Reargument Motion or the Summary Judgment
Reargument Motion, 1. Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e)
("Rule 59(e)") provides that a party may file a
motion for reargument "within 5 days after the filing of
the Court's Order or decision." The standard for
a Rule 59(e) motion is well defined under Delaware
A motion for reargument will be denied unless the Court has
overlooked precedent or legal principles that would have
controlling effect, or misapprehended the law or the facts
such as would affect the outcome of the
Importantly, motions for reargument should not be used merely
to rehash the arguments already decided by the court,
to present new arguments not previously raised. In other words, a
motion for reargument is "not a device for raising new
arguments or stringing out the length of time for making an
argument." Such tactics frustrate the efficient use
of judicial resources, place the opposing party in an unfair
position, and stymie "the orderly process of reaching
closure on the issues."
it relates to the Daubert Order, the Metzgars
request reconsideration of the Court's finding that the
Blevins' expert, Russell Carlson, applied a proper
tree-valuation method for purposes of the Timber Trespass
claim. As it relates to the Summary Judgment Decision, the
Metzgars ask the Court to reconsider its finding that
Trespass to Chattels and Conversion are permissible causes of
action for damage to or removal of trees. The Metzgars argue
that summary judgment is appropriate on the Trespass to
Chattels and Conversion claims as a matter of law, and that
the Court should exclude Mr. Carlson from testifying based on
his improper tree-valuation method.
Court does not find that it overlooked legal precedent or
misapprehended the law or facts in the Daubert Order
or the Summary Judgment Opinion. Moreover, the Metzgars raise
new arguments that they did not present, but could have
presented, in their initial briefing before the
Court. As such, the Court will not grant
reargument on these new arguments. Finally, these new
arguments address disputes that can be resolved by the Court
at or right before trial, as opposed to on a motion for
summary judgment or Daubert motion. Accordingly, the
Court finds no basis to grant reargument.
reality of this civil action is that the Metzgars have
admitted to the Blevins that they removed some trees from the
Blevins' property. That issue is not contested. Section 1401
of Title 25 provides for a remedy when such an event occurs.
The remedy may differ depending on whether the party removes
the tree negligently or intentionally, but there is a remedy.
The Metzgars, recognizing this, are attempting to exclude any
damages evidence presented by the Blevins. The Blevins'
expert characterized his opinion as "restoration"
value instead of "replacement" value; however, the
Court does not find this characterization to mean that the
expert's testimony should be excluded. As such, the Court
will allow Mr. Carlson to testify.
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reargument - Daubert Motion is DENIED and
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument
- Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e).
Kennedy v. Invacare Corp.,
C.A. No. 04C-06-028, 2006 WL 488590, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan.
Woodward v. Farm Family Cas. Ins.
Co., C.A. No. 00C-08-066, 2001 WL 1456865, at *1 (Del.