United States District Court, D. Delaware
before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and to Exclude Testimony of Peter Ivey Regarding
Invalidity Based on the Pentium Pro ("P6") (D.I.
433) and related briefing (D.I. 434, 506, 536). The Court heard
oral argument on April 12, 2017. For the reasons that follow,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and to Exclude Testimony of Peter Ivey (D.I.
433) is DENIED.
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
district court acts as a gatekeeper" to ensure that
expert testimony is reliable and helpful. Schneider v.
Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3rd Cir. 2003). "The
primary locus of this obligation is [Federal Rule of
Evidence] 702." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589(1993). It reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
702, as amended in 2000, codified the Supreme Court's
holding in Daubert. Daubert imposes a
"trilogy" of requirements: (1) qualification, (2)
reliability, and (3) fit. Schneider, 320 F.3d at
404. My determination that proffered testimony complies with
these prerequisites is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a). Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. As such, I must
find Daubert's trilogy of requirements is met by
a preponderance of the evidence. In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3rd Cir. 1994).
one hand, this showing requires the party proffering expert
testimony do more than make a. prima facie case of
reliability. Id. at 743. On the other hand, the
"evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than
the merits standard of correctness." Id. The
proffering party does not "have to prove their case
twice-they do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their
experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate
by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are
reliable." Id. at 744.
objections to Dr. Ivey's testimony fall within the
reliability prong of the Daubert trilogy. Under this
prong, "an expert's testimony is admissible so long
as the process or technique the expert used in formulating
the opinion is reliable." Paoli, 35 F.3d at
742. Reliability does not require certainty,
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, but does require
"validity, " Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. The
Third Circuit has warned, however, that "the reliability
requirement must not be used as a tool by which the court
excludes all questionably reliable evidence."
Id. at 744. An expert's opinion must be founded
on good grounds, not perfect ones. Id. I can
conclude there are good grounds for the opinion even if I
"think there are better grounds for some alternative
conclusion" or that the expert's methodology
"has some flaws such that if they had been corrected,
the scientist would have reached a different result."
Id. The Third Circuit has directed that a
"judge frequently should find an expert's
methodology helpful even when the judge thinks that the
expert's technique has flaws sufficient to render the
conclusions inaccurate." Id. at 744-15.
argues first that Dr. Ivey's opinion as to whether the P6
anticipates the asserted claims is unreliable because he
relied on "uncorroborated statements" made by
"an Intel engineer and former engineer/paid
consultant." (D.I. 434 at 22). Defendant counters that
Dr. Ivey did corroborate the statements to which Plaintiff
objects through his review of "P6 schematics, design
manuals, and timing diagrams" combined with his
experience as a person of skill in the art. (D.I. 506 at 16).
Plaintiff does not respond to this rebuttal, instead arguing
in reply that the engineer/consultant, upon whose statement
Ivey relied, did not review all of the schematics for the
register files. (D.I. 536 at 10). In other words, the
testimony to which Plaintiff objects is that of the engineer
and, therefore, Dr. Ivey's purported reliance on this
testimony. Since Dr. Ivey did, in fact, rely on more than
just this engineer's testimony, it seems to me that
Plaintiffs objection goes to whether Dr. Ivey's
conclusions are correct, not whether they are reliable. This
is not a case, as Plaintiff suggests, where the expert
performed no independent analysis of his own. (D.I. 434 at
next argues that Dr. Ivey's anticipation opinion is
"conclusory" in nature. (D.I. 434 at 22). Plaintiff
asserts that Dr. Ivey did not perform an element-by-element
analysis showing that the P6 practices every claim
limitation. (Id.). Plaintiff further asserts that
Dr. Ivey's failure to identify the circuits he relies on
and the amount of contention in those circuits renders his
opinion unreliable. (Id.). Defendant counters by
pointing to "a detailed claim chart with a
limitation-by-limitation analysis" provided by Dr. Ivey
as well as evidence in the record that the circuit Dr. Ivey
relied on is representative of the topology of register files
in general. (D.I. 506 at ...