United States District Court, D. Delaware
Scott Wilson, Newark, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
E.M. Russell, Esquire, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor,
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, and Janet O. Lee, Esquire and J.
Michael Nolan, III, Esquire, Jackson Lewis P.C.,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Counsel for Defendants.
U.S. District Judge
Roger Scott Wilson ("Plaintiff') proceeds pro
se. He commenced this action on October 23, 2015,
pursuant to the whistleblower protection provision of the
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2087
("CPSA"), and the employee protection provision of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 218c
("FLSA"). (D.I. 1) The Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.
before the Court are Defendants' motion to dismiss and
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, as well as the
parties' oppositions to both motions. (D.I. 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21) For the reasons that follow, the Court will
grant Defendants' motion and will deny Plaintiffs motion.
was employed by Defendants E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and
Company ("Du Pont") and Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc. ("Pioneer") in various
positions for some 24 years until July 27, 2012, when, he
alleges, he was forced to resign. Plaintiff alleges that his
resignation was the culmination of retaliation and harassment
that he endured for 12 years after he refused to file a
falsified safety report in August 2000 concerning a July 27,
2000 gas cylinder leak incident. Plaintiff alleges that he
was discharged in violation of the CPSA and the FLSA. He
seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally
construed and his complaint, "however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not
whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Utig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court may grant such a
motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and
viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna,
Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and
conclusions. See Ashcrojt p. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that
a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City
of "Shelby, __U.S.__, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A
complaint may not dismissed, however, for imperfect
statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.
See Id. at 346.
the pleading regime established by Twombly and
Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a
complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2)
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and
(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief. See Connelly v. Lane
Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). Deciding
whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679.
survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. SeeWilliams v. BASF Catalysts IJLC,765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim
is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At bottom,
"[t]he complaint must state enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
[each] necessary ...