United States District Court, D. Delaware
QUENTIN T. JONES Plaintiff,
STATE OF DELAWARE, et al, Defendants.
Quentin T. Jones, Sussex Correctional Institution,
Georgetown, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Quentin T. Jones ("Plaintiff), an inmate at the Sussex
Correctional Institution ("SCI") in Georgetown,
Delaware, filed this action alleging constitutional
violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 2, 5) He
appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. (D.I. 9) The Court proceeds to
review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a).
February 4, 2015, Plaintiff was questioned about an alleged
rape, charged after questioning, and held at the SCI as a
pretrial detainee. Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant Jeremy
L. Jones ("Jones"), a detective with the Delaware
State Police (Troop 4) ("State Police"). Plaintiff
was convicted in February 2016 and sentenced in April 2016.
alleges that he was detained following his arrest and
convicted without any DNA or rape kit testing. He contends
the alleged victim should have been taken into medical
custody to have DNA analysis collection kits performed
"on the alleged victim and suspect immediately."
(D.I. 2 at 6) Plaintiff alleges that Jones has "a duty
to see that those steps to a DNA analysis collection kit in
any rape 1st sexual assault case have been taken
from the alleged victim and suspect." (Id.)
also alleges that Defendant Amanda Young ("Young"),
a forensic interview examiner, examined the alleged sexual
assault victim. Plaintiff contends that Young should have
sent the patient/client "to an out-patient body exam
specialist to be checked out and make sure the alleged victim
was not damaged in any way, shape or form in her vaginal and
rectum areas." (Id. at 7) Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant State of Delaware ("State") or an
official of the State should be held accountable for failing
to complete the procedures of a rape 1st sexual
assault case, including DNA analysis collection kits.
seeks to be "justified and vindicated of the false
alleged accusations, " and requests compensatory
damages. (Id. at 8) He also requests appointment of
counsel and has moved to dismiss the complaint only if he is
not accountable for payment of the filing fee. (D.I. 16, 18)
federal court may properly dismiss an action sua
sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v.
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Or. 2013); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma
pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in
which prisoner seeks redress from governmental defendant); 42
U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to
prison conditions). The Court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light
most favorable to a. pro se plaintiff. See
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d
Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his complaint,
"however in artfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations
action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)® and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may
dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual
scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see
also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir.
1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,
1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging
that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to
give it back).
legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §
1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when
deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscherv.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to
state claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the
Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint,
unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court
concludes that those allegations "could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief." BellAtl. Corp. v.
Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though "detailed
factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must
do more than simply provide "labels and
conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action." Davis v. Abington
Mem'lHosp.,765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC,765 F.3d 306,
315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twomblj, 550 U.S. at 570).
Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that
a claim ...