United States District Court, D. Delaware
2015, the court denied as time-barred petitioner Bruce
Wood's petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (D.I. 59; D.I. 60) The court
alternatively denied some of the claims as procedurally
barred and some of the claims as failing to satisfy the
standard § 2254(d)(1). (D.I. 59) Wood filed a motion for
reargument, which the court denied. (D.I. 62; D.I. 71; D.I.
72) Wood appealed, and the Third Circuit denied his
certificate of appealability. (D.I. 66; D.I. 77) Wood then
filed the pending Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration
(D.I. 81), an amendment to the Rule 60(b)(6) motion (D.I.
85), a motion to withdraw the amendment (D.I. 87), and a
motion for an evidentiary hearing (D.I. 80).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
motion for reconsideration should be granted to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906,
909 (3d Cir. 1985). Accordingly, a court may grant a motion
for reconsideration if the moving party shows one of the
following: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law;
(2) the availability of new evidence that was not available
when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent a manifest
injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176
F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)(citing North River Ins. Co.
v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.
1995)). A motion for reconsideration is not appropriate to
reargue issues that the court has already considered and
decided. Brambles USA Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp.
1239, 1240 (D.Del. 1990).
when, as here, a district court is presented with a Rule
60(b) motion after it has denied the petitioner's federal
habeas application, the court must first determine if the
Rule 60(b) motion constitutes a second or successive
application under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). As articulated by the Third
in those instances in which the factual predicate of a
petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion attacks the manner in
which the earlier habeas judgment was procured and not the
underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b) motion may be
adjudicated on the merits. However, when the Rule 60(b)
motion seeks to collaterally attack the petitioner's
underlying conviction, the motion should be treated as a
successive habeas petition.
Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 (3d Cir.
2004). Under AEDPA, a prisoner cannot file a second or
successive habeas application without first obtaining
approval from the Court of Appeals. Absent such
authorization, a district court cannot consider the merits of
a subsequent application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A);
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139-40 (3d Cir.
contends that the court erroneously denied his petition as
time-barred because it should have acknowledged that his
second Rule 61 motion statutorily tolled the limitations
period pursuant to Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4
begin, the court will grant Wood's motion to withdraw the
amendment to his Rule 60(b)(6) motion (D.I. 87). In turn,
since Wood's Rule 60(b)(6) motion challenges the
court's timeliness ruling, the court will consider the
motion to be a true Rule 60(b) motion and not a second or
successive habeas petition. See Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 533 (2005). Nevertheless, Wood's motion
fails to warrant relief. Wood contends that the court
erroneously denied his petition as time-barred because it
should have acknowledged that his second Rule 61 motion
statutorily tolled the limitations period pursuant to
Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000). This argument,
however, merely asserts his disagreement with the court's
decision to deny his petition, and expands upon an argument
the court already considered and rejected when it denied
Wood's motion for reargument. (D.I. 71; D.I. 72) Notably,
Wood's instant Artuz argument does not assert an
intervening change in law, the availability of previously
unavailable evidence, or a "clear error of law" of
the sort that would compel reconsideration.
extent Wood challenges the court's alternative dismissal
of the claims as procedurally barred and/or for failing to
satisfy § 2254(d), the court concludes that reargument
is not warranted. Once again, Wood essentially reasserts
arguments already considered and rejected, and these
arguments fail to show that reargument is necessary in order
to correct a clear error of law or fact, or to prevent a
manifest injustice. Thus, the court will not reconsider
its prior denial of the claims as procedurally barred and/or
for failing to satisfy § 2254(d).
given the court's decision to deny the instant Rule
60(b)(6) motion, the court will deny as moot Wood's
motion for an evidentiary hearing. (D.I .80)
aforementioned reasons, the court will deny the instant Rule
60(b) motion and the motion for an evidentiary hearing. In
addition, the court will not issue a certificate of
appealability, because Lopez has failed to make a
"substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); See United
States v. ...