United States District Court, D. Delaware
LEONARD P. STARK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
reviewed the parties' briefing and filings with respect
to Future Link Systems, LLC's ("Future Link")
Motion for Reconsideration (D.I. 463) and Motion for Leave to
File a Reply Brief (D.I. 484), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Future Link's Motion for Leave (D.I. 484) is GRANTED.
Future Link's Motion for Reconsideration (D.I. 463) is
DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.5, a motion for
reconsideration should be granted only "sparingly."
The decision to grant such a motion lies squarely within the
discretion of the district court. See Dentsply Int'l,
Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F.Supp.2d 385, 419 (D. Del.
1999); Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp.
1239, 1241 (D. Del. 1990). These types of motions are granted
only if the Court has patently misunderstood a party, made a
decision outside the adversarial issues presented by the
parties, or made an error not of reasoning but of
apprehension. See Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 25
F.Supp.2d 293, 295 (D. Del. 1998); Brambles, 735
F.Supp. at 1241. "A motion for reconsideration is not
properly grounded on a request that a court rethink a
decision already made." Smith v. Meyers, 2009
WL 5195928, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2009); see also
Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F.Supp.
1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993). It is not an opportunity to
"accomplish repetition of arguments that were or should
have been presented to the court previously." Karr
v. Castle, 768 F.Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Del. 1991). A
party may seek reconsideration only if it can show at least
one of the following: (i) there has been an intervening
change in controlling law; (ii) the availability of new
evidence not available when the court made its decision; or
(iii) there is a need to correct a clear error of law or fact
to prevent manifest injustice. See Max's Seafood Cafe
ex rel. Lou Ann, Inc. y. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). In no instance should
reconsideration be granted; if it would not result in
i amendment of an order. See Schering
Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d at 295.
Court has considered all briefing and filings, including
those related to Future Link's Motion for Leave, in
deciding the motions.
Court agrees with Intel Corporation ("Intel") that
"Future Link's Motion [for Reconsideration] simply
repeats arguments that were previously raised [at the March
1, 2016 hearing], and does not add anything that could not
have been presented to the Court before the Court's
September 28, 2016 ruling [on summary judgment]." (D.I.
478 at; 5) To the contrary, counsel for Future Link
formulated the argument on which the request for
reconsideration is based no later than the day before the
March 2016 hearing and presented it at that hearing.
(See, e.g., D.I. 463 at 2-3) ("The night before
the March 1, 2016 hearing on Intel Delaware's license
claim, while preparing for the hearing, Future Link's
counsel first noticed that contrary to Intel Delaware's
representations, the license agreement at issue in this case
stated that it was between Philips and Intel, a corporation
of the State of California . . . not Intel Delaware . . .
.") (emphasis omitted) Thereafter, between March and
August 2016, Future Link took discovery on this issue
(see D.I. 478 at 4), but it was not until after the
Court ruled on the summary judgment motion -agreeing, in
large part, with Intel's licensing arguments - that
Future Link chose to press its argument. These circumstances
do not satisfy any of the narrow criteria for
event, Future Link's Motion for Reconsideration also
fails on the merits. The licensing agreement at issue (D.I.
227 Ex. A.1) demonstrates that the signing entities intended
for the agreement to be more than the nullity that it would
amount to if the Court were to interpret the agreement as
being between the Philips entities and a corporation (Intel
California) that both parties agree did not exist at the time
the license agreement was entered into. "[A]
contract can be reformed on the basis of mutual mistake if
the writing does not accurately reflect the mutual intention
of the parties . . . ." Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Dorinco Reinsurance Co., 917 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir.
1990). The agreement at issue here clearly indicates that all
parties to the agreement intended for the signatory Intel
Corporation (i.e., Intel Delaware) to be bound by the
agreement and to receive all rights granted to Intel therein.
Future Link points to no evidence (intrinsic or extrinsic)
that would indicate that the signatory parties intended for
the agreement to be a nullity. The reference in the agreement
to Intel California rather than Intel Delaware is an obvious
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer and,
no later than January 31, submit a proposed redacted version
of this Memorandum Order.
future Link does not appear to dispute
Intel's representation that "Intel California had
merged into Intel Delaware and ceased to exist more than a
year before the effective date of the Intel-Philips
License, such that Intel California had become Intel Delaware
by operation of ...