United States District Court, D. Delaware
UCB, INC., UCB BIOPHARMA SPRLI RESEARCH CORPORATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and HARRIS FRC CORPORATION, Plaintiffs,
ACCORD HEALTHCARE, INC., et al., Defendants.
Jack B. Blumenfeld, Maryellen Noreika, Paul Saindon, Ethan H. Townsend, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington DE George F. Pappas, Paul J. Berman, Jeffrey B. Elikan, Erica N. Andersen, Michael A. Chajon, Christopher P. Nofal, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, DC Alexa R. Hansen, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, San Francisco, CA Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Kenneth L. Dorsney, MORRIS JAMES LLP, Wilmington, DE John W. Shaw, SHAW KELLER LLP, Wilmington, DE Richard D. Kirk, Stephen B. Brauerman, Vanessa R. Tiradentes, BAYARD, P.A., Wilmington, DE Adam W. Poff, Pilar G. Kraman, YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington DE Dominick T. Gattuso, PROCTOR HEYMAN LLP, Wilmington, DE Francis J. Murphy, MURPHY & LANDON, Wilmington, DE John C. Phillips, Jr., Megan C. Haney, PHILLIPS GOLDMAN & SPENCE, P.A., Wilmington, DE Nicole Stafford, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, Austin, TX Attorneys for Defendants.
LEONARD P. STARK, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiffs Research Corporation Technologies, Inc., Harris FRC Corporation, and UCB BioPhanna SPRL ("Plaintiffs") filed patent infringement actions against multiple defendants ("Defendants") for infringing U.S. Reissued Patent No. RE 38, 551 ("the '551 Patent") after Defendants filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (D.I. 1) The '551 Patent generally relates to an anticonvulsant drug, marketed under the name Vimpat, having lacosamide as its active ingredient. ( Id.)
Pending before the Court is the issue of claim construction for one term in the patent-in-suit: "therapeutic composition, " as used in claim 10. The parties completed briefing on claim construction on November 24, 2014. (D.I. 158, 160, 176, 178) In addition to briefing, the parties submitted multimedia technology tutorials. (D.I. 167, 168) The Court held a claim consturction hearing on December 15, 2014. ( See Transcript ("Tr."))
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
The ultimate question of the proper construction of a patent is a question oflaw. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 837 (2015) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996)). "It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. Instead, the court is free to attach the appropriate weight to appropriate sources "in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law." Id.
"[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning... [which is] the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Id. at 1312-13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "[T]he ordinary meaning of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent." Id. at 1321 (internal quotation marks omitted). The patent specification "is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
While "the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms, " the context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Furthermore, "[o]ther claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be valuable sources of enlightenment... [b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent...." Id. (internal citation omitted).
It is likewise true that "[d]ifferences among claims can also be a useful guide.... For example, the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim." Id. at 1314-15 (internal citation omitted). This "presumption is especially strong when the limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and dependent claim, and one party is urging that the limitation in the dependent claim should be read into the independent claim." SunRace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
It is also possible that "the specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor's lexicography governs." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. It bears emphasis that "[e]ven when the specification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction." Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
In addition to the specification, a court "should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The prosecution history, which is "intrinsic evidence, " "consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO [Patent and Trademark Office] and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. "[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be." Id.
In some cases, "the district court will need to look beyond the patent's intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period." Teva, 135 S.Ct. at 841. Extrinsic evidence "consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises." Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. For instance, technical dictionaries can assist the court in determining the meaning.of a term to those of skill in the relevant art because such dictionaries "endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. In addition, expert testimony can be useful "to ensure that the court's understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field." Id. Nonetheless, courts must not lose sight of the fact that "expert reports and testimony [are] generated at the time of and for the purpose oflitigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence." Id. Overall, while extrinsic evidence "may be useful" to the court, it is "less reliable" than intrinsic evidence, and its consideration "is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence." Id. at 1318-19. Where the intrinsic record unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583).
Finally, "[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction." Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societ' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). It follows that "a claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor's device is rarely the ...