United States District Court, D. Delaware
FAIRCHILD SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION and FAIRCHILD (TAIWAN) CORPORATION, Plaintiffs,
POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC., Defendant
UNSEALED ON APRIL 20, 2015
For Plaintiffs: John G. Day, Lauren E. Maguire, Andrew C. Mayo, ASHBY & GEDDES, Wilmington, DE; Blair M. Jacobs, Christina A. Ondrick, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, Washington, D.C.
For Defendant: William J. Marsden, Jr., Joseph B. Warden, Jr., FISH & RICHARDSON P.C., Wilmington, DE; Frank E. Scherkenbach, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C., Boston, MA; Howard G. Pollack, Michael R. Headley, FISH & RICHARDSON P.C., Redwood City, CA.
Leonard P. Stark, United States District Judge.
Pending before the Court are the following motions:
1. Power Integrations' Motion to Sever and Stay Fairchild's Claims Regarding the '972 Patent (D.I. 187);
2. Fairchild's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Preclusion Law Bars Power Integrations From Re-Litigating the Validity and Direct Infringement of Claims 6, 7, 18 and 19 of U.S. Patent No. 7,259,972 (D.I. 190);
3. Fairchild's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 193); and
4. Power Integrations' Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 196).
In this Memorandum Opinion, the Court addresses and resolves the first motion, deciding not to sever and stay proceedings with respect to the '972 patent. With respect to the preclusion issues, the Court resolves certain disputes, but needs further assistance from the parties before it can determine if resolution of these disputes also resolves some or all of Fairchild's motion. Both parties' summary judgment motions raise multiple issues (eight from Fairchild and five from Power Integrations). Here the Court only resolves the parties' disputes regarding whether Fairchild's '915 patent is prior art to Power Integrations' asserted '457 patent (as well as a portion of Power Integrations' seeking summary judgment relating to literal infringement of the '972 patent, which Fairchild does not oppose).
On May 1, 2012, Plaintiffs Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation and Fairchild (Taiwan) Corporation (collectively, " Fairchild" or " Plaintiffs" ) filed a complaint against Power Integrations, Inc. (" Power Integrations" or " PI" or " Defendant" ) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,525,259 (" the '259 Patent" ), 7,259,972 (" the '972 Patent" ), 7,616,461 (" the '461 Patent" ), and 7,286,123 (" the '123 Patent" ). (D.I. 1) On June 21, 2012, Power Integrations counterclaimed against Fairchild, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,229,366 (" the '366 Patent" ), 7,876,587 (" the '587 Patent" ), 8,115,457 (" the '457 Patent" ), and 7,995,359 (" the '359 Patent" ).
Fact and expert discovery are complete and trial will begin on May 26, 2015. The Court heard oral argument on the pending motions on March 3, 2015. ( See D.I. 292 (" Tr." ))
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Sever and Stay
Whether or not to stay litigation pending reexamination by the PTO of the patents-in-suit is a matter left to the Court's discretion. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In exercising this discretion, the Court must weigh the competing interests of the parties. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936). The factors typically considered are: (1) whether a stay will simplify the issues and trial of the case, (2) whether discovery is complete and a trial date has been set, and (3) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party. See St. Clair Intellectual Prop. v. Sony Corp., 2003 WL 25283239, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2003).
B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), alleging a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is analyzed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss all or part of an action for " failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion to dismiss requires a court to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). " The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, a court may grant a motion to dismiss only if, after " accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Court may consider matters of public record, and authentic documents upon which the complaint is based if attached to the complaint or as an exhibit to the motion. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court may also take judicial notice of the factual record of a prior proceeding. See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). Ultimately, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be granted " only if no relief could be afforded under any set of facts that could be proved." Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, " [t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be - or, alternatively, is - genuinely disputed must be supported either by citing to " particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by " showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then " come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation mark omitted). The Court will " draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must " do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating party opposing summary judgment " must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue" ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The " mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; " a factual dispute is genuine only where " the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). " If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated " against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial" ). Thus, the ...