Submitted: May 19, 2014
Upon Defendant’s Fifth Motion for Postconviction Relief.
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
Upon Defendant’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing.
James J. Kriner, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Willis L. Grayson, II, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.
Richard R. Cooch, R.J.
This 14th day of August 2014, upon consideration of Defendant's Fifth Motion for Postconviction Relief, Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Willis Grayson ("Defendant") filed this Fifth Motion for Postconviction Relief and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing based on several theories, most prominent among being that Defendant asserts he is entitled to counsel under the decisions in Martinez v. Ryan and Holmes v. State.
2. A jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of Rape Second Degree on September 16, 1985. Defendant was subsequently sentenced on March 7, 1986 to thirty years at Level V for each conviction, sentences to run consecutively, for a total of sixty years. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed Defendant's convictions on direct appeal on April 10, 1987.
3. Defendant's First Motion for Postconviction Relief, filed pro se, was denied by this Court on December 15, 1992. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the denial of that motion on March 15, 1993; Defendant raised eight grounds for relief in his initial motion with the Superior Court, but only three when appealing this Court's denial to the Supreme Court of Delaware, thereby waiving the remaining five claims. As set forth in the Court's opinion denying Defendant's initial motion for postconviction relief, Defendant's alleged grounds for relief were as follows: 1) "Absence of medical record;" 2) "Sufficiency of the evidence;" 3) Vagueness of statute;" 4) "Admission of the medical record;" 5) Unlawful use of peremptory challenges;" 6) "Grand jury proceedings;" 7) "Ineffective assistance of counsel;" and 8) "Admission of testimony concerning a 'riding crop.'"
4. Defendant filed his Second Motion for Postconviction Relief pro se on May 17, 2002, and this motion was summarily dismissed. This motion was a "cookie cutter" submission; it was one of multiple identical motions for postconviction relief and supporting memoranda that were submitted by convicted sex offenders within the same general timeframe. Therefore, Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief was deemed "utterly without merit" and summarily dismissed by this Court. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed this summary dismissal on September 19, 2002.
5. Defendant filed his Third Motion for Postconviction Relief pro se on March 27, 2007. Defendant asserted four grounds for relief including 1) double jeopardy, (2) lack of jurisdiction, (3) prejudice due to the absence of a certain medical report, and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court found Defendant's claims to be procedurally barred, summarily dismissed Defendant's motion, and denied his request for appointment of counsel under Rule 61 (e) for failure to show good cause. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed this summary dismissal on January 7, 2008.
6. Defendant filed his Fourth Motion for Postconviction Relief pro se on November 8, 2010. Defendant raised four grounds for postconviction relief in the instant motion: 1) double jeopardy; 2) The "second" trial court lacked jurisdiction; 3) "Filure [sic] to produce and provide Defendant with complete copy of ITC's [presumably "initial trial court"] mistrial transcript, " and 4) ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court, again, summarily dismissed Defendant's Fourth Motion for ...