United States District Court, D. Delaware
August 14, 2014
ROBERT CAMILLE, Movant/Defendant,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent/Plaintiff. Crim. A. No. 96-09-LPS.
LEONARD P. STARK, District Judge.
In June 1996, Movant Robert Camille pled guilty to car jacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and use of a firearm during and in relation to a violent crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). (D.I. 27) The Honorable Joseph J. Longobardi sentenced him to 175 months imprisonment. (D.I. 45) Movant's convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. (D.I. 51)
In 1998, Movant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D.I. 52), which the Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. denied as time-barred. See United States v. Cammile, 2001 WL 877578 (D. Del. Aug. 1, 2001). In July 2013, Movant filed a Motion to Grant Good Faith for Time Served. (D.I. 90) The Court denied that Motion after construing it as a request to order the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to recalculate Movant's sentence. (D.I. 94)
On January 6, 2014, Movant filed a new § 2255 Motion, asserting that his sentence violates United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because it "incorporated judicial factfinding under a preponderance standard." (D.I. 95 at 1) Contending that Booker and Blakely apply retroactively to his case, Movant requests the Court to vacate his sentence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a prisoner cannot file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without first seeking and receiving approval from the appropriate court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (h); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); Rule 9, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255.
Absent such authorization, a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of a subsequent§ 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4); Pelullo v. United States, 487 F.App'x 1, 2 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012); In re Olabode, 325 F.3d 166, 169-73 (3d Cir. 2003).
The instant§ 2255 motion is Movant's second request to vacate the sentence imposed for his convictions in 1996. The dismissal of Movant's first § 2255 Motion as time-barred constitutes an adjudication on the merits, rendering the instant Motion second or successive for the gate-keeping purposes of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 (a) and 2255(h). See Faines v. United States, 2013 WL 6571679, *1 (D. Del. Dec. 12, 2013) (collecting cases). The record does not contain any indication that Movant obtained an order from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals allowing this Court to consider the pending § 2255 motion. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the instant Motion for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2002) (if a movant files a second or successive motion "in a district court without the permission of a court of appeals, the district court's only option is to dismiss the [motion] or transfer it to the court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631").
The Court will also decline to issue a certificate of appealability because Movant has failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011); United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1997).
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Movant's § 2255 Motion constitutes an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and § 2255(h). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Movant's § 2255 Motion for lack of jurisdiction.
A separate Order will be entered.