United States District Court, D. Delaware
KERRY JOHNSON, and SHARON ANDERSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated Plaintiffs;
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
Richard H. Cross, Jr., Esq. (argued) and Christopher P. Simon, Esq., Cross and Simon LLC, Wilmington, DE, attorneys for the Plaintiff.
Paul A. Bradley, Esq., Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson, LLC, Wilmington, DE; George M. Church, Esq. (argued), Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Baltimore, MD; Meloney Perry, Esq. (argued), Perry Law P.C., Dallas, TX, attorneys for the Defendants.
RICHARD G. ANDREWS, District Judge.
This is a continuation of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated March 26, 2014. (D.I. 655). This matter has been fully briefed. (D.I. 585, 599, 611, 662). The Court heard oral argument on May 8, 2014. (D.I. 663). For the reasons set forth herein, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Count II - Breach of Contract
To prove a breach of contract claim, the Plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) a breach of the contract, (3) and that the breach of the contract was the proximate cause of damages. VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003).
The Court assumes without deciding that there is binding contract between the parties and that there was a breach of said contract. Thus, the Court turns its attention to whether the breach of the contract was the proximate cause of the claimed damages.
GEICO argues that, "There is no legally sufficient evidence to establish a causal relationship between the auto accident and [the] treatment rendered between June 13, 2005 and October 27, 2005." (D.I. 585 at 38). GEICO maintains that for the Plaintiff to establish that GEICO breached its contract for nonpayment for a rendered treatment, the Plaintiff "must present legally sufficient evidence to establish a causal relationship between the accident and this treatment." Id. GEICO further presents the Court with evidence that, while at the time of the PIP claim there was no reason to question causation, discovery in this case has raised the issue of causation. Specifically, discovery has shown that the Plaintiff has suffered longstanding chronic back and neck problems, the same injury of which the Plaintiff now complains. Id. GEICO also presents deposition testimony showing that Dr. Jones, the Plaintiffs doctor, "admitted that he could not state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty or probability that the treatment at issue was causally related." Id. (citing D.I. 654-3 at 9 (Dr. Jones stating, "All I know is [that] she came in and told me the pain was related to the accident.")). Furthermore, GEICO maintains that under Delaware law, proof of medical causation requires expert testimony, and no such testimony has been proffered here. (D.I. 585 at 39 (citing Habel v. Temple University Hospital, 2005 WL 637918 (D. Del. March 10, 2005)).
The Plaintiff argues that "to the extent that GEICO now attacks payment of Anderson's medical bills as not prescribed or necessary, GEICO has waived such challenge by not raising it within the mandatory 30-day period. Even if GEICO were allowed to concoct a post-facto reason why coverage was not warranted, [Ms.] Anderson has established through the testimony and report of her treating physician that her treatment was reimbursable under her policy." (D.I. 599 at 41 (internal citations and footnotes omitted)). The Plaintiff further maintains that any preexisting disease or infirmity that she may have suffered is covered by Delaware's longstanding eggshell skull rule. Id. (citing Reese v. Home Budget Center, 619 A.2d 907, 910 n.1 (Del. 1992)).
The determination of proximate cause of an injury, especially as related to an automobile accident, is not a matter of common knowledge and thus expert medical testimony is required. Sluss v. Davis, 2006 WL 2846387 at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 4, 2006); See also Rayfield v. Power, 840 A.2d 642 (Del. 2003). Here, GEICO has proffered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs back and neck problems preexisted the car accident. This showing shifts the burden to the Plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her injuries were caused by the car accident, and thus that her claims were reasonable and necessary.
Ms. Anderson has put forth no evidence to establish that the treatment rendered to her was causally connected to the automobile accident. There is nothing in the record, as presented to the Court now, other than argument, to show that the Plaintiffs treatment was a reasonable and necessary medical expense that arose from injuries sustained in the automobile accident. Furthermore, once GEICO put forth evidence showing that the Plaintiffs injuries were unrelated to the car accident, it became the Plaintiffs burden to bring forth medical expert testimony to prove causation. Despite the years that this case has been before the ...